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Abstract
The decrease in price and the ease of use of wireless network devices make them an attractive 
alternative to standard wired networks. However, the intrinsic insecurity of wireless media and 
weaknesses in the standards for use of wireless media leave wireless networks vulnerable to 
attacks from unauthorized users. The intrinsic insecurity of wireless media results from radio 
signals extending beyond the networks intended coverage area and the weaknesses in the 
standards result from the methods used for authorization and privacy. These insecurities restrict 
the use of wireless networks by entities that need a high level of security. This paper describes a 
Wireless Intrusion Detection System (WIDS) that provides additional security for 802.11b 
wireless networks. WIDS provides intrusion detection that can react to potential threats and 
locate an intruder through the use of intelligent access points equipped with rotating directional 
antennas.
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Chapter 1: Introduction
In November 2003, three Michigan men were indicted on federal charges in North Carolina for 
allegedly breaking into the Lowe’s home improvement chain’s central computer system and 
attempting to steal credit card numbers. According to the indictment, the men used a wireless 
computer card to access the wireless network of a Southfield, Michigan Lowe’s store and used 
that connection to connect to the Lowe’s central computer system in North Carolina and store 
systems at seven Lowe’s stores around the country. Software used to process credit card 
transactions was modified to save credit card numbers for later retrieval. Only six credit card 
numbers were collected. Two of the men told the FBI that they discovered the Southfield, 
Michigan Lowe’s wireless system while wardriving. The men were operating out of a 1995 
Pontiac Grand Prix parked outside the Southfield store. It is not known if the Lowe’s wireless 
system was using encryption. [1], [2], [3]
Much has been written in recent years about the insecurity of wireless networks and 802.11. 
Attacks against wireless networks are not just theoretical. Software for attacking 802.11 
networks can be downloaded from the Internet and there are numerous types of attacks ranging 
from simple network discovery to complex WEP key cracking. Attacks can be either active or 
passive. Searching for wireless networks by driving around in cars equipped with a laptop 
computer, a wireless card and a network discovery program has become so commonplace that it 
has been given the name “wardriving.”
Wireless networks are becoming more and more widespread. The cost of wireless access 
point/routers, wireless cards and other hardware for a wireless network continues to decrease and 
is readily available at electronic stores and over the Internet for less than $50 [4]. In September 
2004, Comp USA advertised a Netgear 802.11b router and wireless USB adapter for a total price 
of $19.98 [5]. 802.11 wireless cards are included as standard networking devices on many laptop 
computers and PDA’s. As the price decreases home, business and governmental use of wireless 
networks is increasing. 
However, the use of a wireless network comes with some built-in insecurities that are not present 
in wired networks. The wireless medium is broadcast by radio waves, which can be received by 
anyone within range who has the proper wireless hardware. The radio waves have no absolute 
boundaries and often extend beyond their area of intended coverage. No physical connection to 
the wireless network is needed. Those characteristics of a wireless network leave it open to active 
and passive attacks. Many of these networks use the 802.11b protocol.
While there are numerous wireless intrusion detection systems (IDS) available, most of them 
operate in the radio frequency (RF) monitor mode. An IDS operating in the monitor mode can see 
the frames in real time, but is not able to actively respond to identified threats, interact directly 
with an intruder or locate the intruder. Some save the monitored data and later look for anomalies 
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in the data to identify intruders [6]. Others just send alerts when a potential intruder is noticed 
[7]. If the data requires subsequent analysis to identify a potential problem, then the intruder 
could be gone before anyone knows he was there. An alert requires someone else or another 
program to take any action. 
This paper presents a wireless intrusion detection system (WIDS) that provides additional 
security not found in other wireless intrusion detection systems. The WIDS provides security 
around the perimeter of a wireless network and identifies and locates potential intruders before 
they can connect to the internal network. The WIDS contains access points equipped with 
directional antennas that operate as intrusion detection devices, and the access points can interact 
with intruding stations, deny access, ignore frames, react to certain criteria, etc. The WIDS access 
points connect to a controller computer via a wired network. The controller computer configures 
the WIDS access points, shows statistics from stations associated with the WIDS access points, 
logs data sent by the WIDS access points, and locates intruder stations using data from two 
WIDS access points. The advantage of WIDS over other wireless intrusion detection systems is 
that WIDS can actively respond to potential threats and can locate the potential intruders before 
they can attack an interior network.
The following chapters present sections of the IEEE 802.11 standard “Wireless LAN Medium 
Access Control (MAC) and Physical Layer (PHY) Specifications” that are most applicable to 
WIDS, security problems and attacks on IEEE 802.11b networks, a discussion of research done 
by others on locating 802.11 wireless stations, a more detailed description of WIDS, a partial 
implementation of WIDS, and test results of WIDS implementation. The paper ends with a 
conclusion and suggestions for future work. 
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Chapter 2: IEEE Standard 802.11 
2.1 Overview
802.11 is part of a family of standards for local and metropolitan area networks dealing with the 
Physical and Data Link layers as defined by the International Organization for Standardization 
(ISO) Open Systems Interconnection (OSI) Basic Reference Model (ISO/IEC 7498-1: 1994). The 
802.11 standards describe seven types of medium access technologies and related physical media. 
Physical and data link standards for fixed, portable, and moving stations in a local area network 
(LAN) using the media of air, radio, or infrared are described in ANSI/IEEE Std 802.11, 1999 
Edition entitled “Information technology -Telecommunications and information exchange 
between systems - Local and metropolitan area networks -Specific requirements - Part 11: 
Wireless LAN Medium Access Control (MAC) and Physical Layer (PHY) Specifications.” [8] 
The standard includes a protocol for authentication, association, and reassociation services, an 
optional encryption/decryption procedure, power management, a distributed coordination 
function, and a point coordination function for the bounded transfer of data.
Wireless devices that communicate by radio can use either a frequency-hopping spread spectrum 
(FHSS) supporting 1 Mbit/s and an optional 2 Mbit/s data rate or a direct sequence spread 
spectrum (DSSS) supporting both 1 and 2 Mbit/s data rates using the carrier sense multiple 
access protocol with collision avoidance (CSMA/CA) medium sharing mechanism. IEEE Std 
802.11b-1999 modified IEEE Std 802.11 by extending DSSS to support 5.5 Mbit/s and 11 
Mbit/s payload data rates. 
2.2 Differences between wired and wireless LANs
There are substantial differences between wired and wireless LANs. IEEE802.11 explains some 
of these differences and describes ways to handle them. Some of the ways in which IEEE802.11 
physical layers are different from wired media are:
• A destination address is not equal to a physical location. In wired LANs, an address 
represents a physical location. In 802.11, the addressable entity is a station. Stations are 
allowed to be mobile, so a station represents a destination that is not the same as a 
physical location.
• 802.11 media have no absolute or readily observable boundaries and are unprotected from 
outside signals.
• 802.11 must handle mobile and portable stations. Mobile stations access the LAN while in 
motion.
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In order to appear as an IEEE 802 LAN to higher layers (logical link control), an 802.11 network 
must handle station mobility within the MAC layer. 
The bottom two layers of the OSI model are the physical layer (layer 1) and the data link layer 
(layer 2). In 802.11, the data link layer has two sublayers - the Media Access Control (MAC) 
sublayer and the Logical Link Control (LLC) sublayer. The physical layer handles the physical 
layer convergence protocol (PLCP) and the physical medium.
2.3 802.11 architecture 
The standard describes an 802.11 architecture for a wireless LAN that is made up of interacting 
components. The 802.11 architecture supports station mobility and is transparent to upper 
layers.  The components of an 802.11 wireless LAN include:
• basic service set (BSS) - a set of stations controlled by a single coordination function. A BSS 
is the most basic component.
  
• basic service area (BSA) - the coverage area where the BSS members can communicate with 
each other.
• independent BSS (IBSS) - the most basic type of 802.11 LAN. It can consist of only two 
stations communicating with each other. An IBSS is often referred to as an ad hoc 
network. 
• distribution system (DS) - connects multiple basic service sets to create an extended service 
set.
• extended service set (ESS) - a network of DS and BSSs.
• station (STA) - a device containing an 802.11 medium access control (MAC) and physical 
layer (PHY) interface to a wireless medium (WM). Stations include access points.
• access point (AP) - a station that provides access to the DS by providing DS services in 
addition to acting as a station. Data move between a BSS and the DS via an AP. 
• portal - the logical point at which medium access control service data units (MSDUs) from an 
integrated non-IEEE 802.11 local area network (LAN) enter the distribution system (DS) 
of an extended service set (ESS). It is possible for a device to function as an access point 
and a portal.
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2.4 802.11 services
802.11 does not specify how a DS is implemented. It specifies services associated with different 
components of the architecture. There are two kinds of 802.11 services – station service (SS) and 
distribution system service (DSS). Both are used by 802.11 MAC sublayer.
The station services are:
• Authentication - The authentication service is used by all stations to establish their identity 
to stations with which they will communicate. If authentication has not been established 
between two stations, association will not be allowed. A station may be authenticated 
with more than one station at a time.
• Deauthentication - The deauthentication service causes the station to be disassociated. Either 
authenticated party may send a deauthentication notice to the other party. The 
deauthentication notice cannot be refused by either party. 
• Privacy - The privacy service provides confidentiality of data in the 802.11 LAN.
• MAC service data unit (MSDU) delivery - Information that is delivered as a unit between 
MAC service access points (SAPs).
The distribution system services are:
• Association - A station must associate with an access point before it is allowed to send a 
message via the access point. Association is always started by the mobile station and not 
by the access point. A station may be associated with only one access point at one time. 
An access point may be associated with numerous stations at one time.
• Disassociation - Either authenticated party may send a disassociation notice. The 
disassociation notice cannot be refused by either party. 
• Distribution - The distribution service delivers medium access control service data units 
(MSDUs) within the distribution system. IEEE 802.11 does not specify how the message 
is distributed within the DS.
• Integration - The integration service enables delivery of medium access control service data 
units (MSDUs) between the distribution system (DS) and a non-IEEE 802.11 local area 
network. The details of an integration service depend on a specific DS implementation 
and are not covered by the standard.
• Reassociation - The reassociation service is invoked when a mobile station moves one AP to 
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another. The mobile station always starts the reassociation.
2.4.1 Authentication and privacy
Access and confidentiality in 802.11 was designed to provide functionality equivalent to that 
which is inherent to wired LANs. Access and confidentiality in a wired LAN are controlled by 
the closed nature of the wired media. In a wired LAN, data passes through the wired media and is 
accessible only by devices physically connected to the network. In a wireless LAN, there is no 
physical connection to the LAN and any device within range with the correct type of hardware is 
able to receive data from the wireless LAN. Authentication is used in place of the physical 
connection to the wired LAN to provide access. Privacy provides the confidentiality of the wired 
LAN.
Authentication between stations is at the link level and is used to provide a wireless link equal to 
the assumed physical standards of a wired link. IEEE 802.11 uses authentication instead of a 
wired physical connection. Message origin to message destination, user to user, or per packet 
authentications are not provided by IEEE 802.11. Several authentication processes are supported 
including the open system authentication, which allows any station to become authenticated, and 
shared key authentication, which uses a shared, secret, wired equivalency privacy (WEP) key. 
Privacy is provided by the wired equivalency privacy (WEP) algorithm. According to the 
standard, WEP “is designed to satisfy the goal of wired LAN ‘equivalent’ privacy. The algorithm 
is not designed for ultimate security but rather to be ‘at least as secure as a wire.’” Privacy is 
provided for data frames and some authentication management frames. Initial data sent to set up 
the authentication and privacy services is sent in the clear. Unencrypted data frames received by 
a station expecting encrypted data frames are ignored.
2.5 Relationships between services
Each station keeps two state variables for each station it wants to communicate with. These are 
authentication state with values unauthenticated and authenticated, and association state with 
values unassociated and associated. The two state variables create three local states for each 
remote station. These are: state 1 - unathenticated, unassociated; state 2 – authenticated, not 
associated; state 3 – authenticated and associated.
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Figure 1: State variables and services
 
Each service is supported by one or more MAC message types. Three types of messages are 
used by the IEEE 802.11 sublayer - data, management and control. Data messages contain data. 
Management messages support the IEEE 802.11services. Control messages support the delivery 
of the other two message types. Messages are sent via IEEE 802.11 frames.
2.6 MAC Frame Format
MAC frames contain a MAC header, a frame body, and a frame check sequence (FCS).
Figure 2: MAC frame format
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The MAC header is made up of several fields:
• Frame control - details given later in section 2.6.1
• Duration/ID – For power save - poll frame subtype, this field contains the association 
identity (AID) of station that sent the frame. For all other frames, this field contains a 
duration value, which depends on the frame type. 
• Addresses 1,2,3, and 4 – MAC addresses for sending and receiving messages. These fields are 
used for BSSID, destination, source, receiver, and transmitter addresses. 
• Sequence control – Consists of a four bit fragment number and a twelve bit sequence number.
• Frame body – A variable length field containing information for the individual frame types 
and subtypes.
• FCS – contains a 32 bit cycle redundancy code (CRC).
2.6.1 Frame Control Format
An IEEE 802.11 frame control field has the following format.
Figure 3: Frame control format
• Protocol version – Identifies frames that are compatible with IEEE 802.11
• Type – Management, control, and data are allowed types
• Subtype – Together with type, identifies function of frame
• To DS – Set to ‘1’ if frame is going to the DS
• From DS – Set to ‘1’ if frame is coming from DS
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• More Frag – Set to ‘1’ if there is another fragment
• Retry – Set to ‘1’ if frame is in retransmission
• Pwr Mgt – Set to ‘1’ if sending station is in power save mode
• More Data – Set to ‘1’ if more frames are to be transmitted
• WEP – Set to ‘1’ if WEP encryption is enabled
• Order – Set to ‘1’ if frames are strictly ordered
2.7 IEEE 802.11i 
IEEE 802.11i, ratified in June 2004, is an addendum to IEEE 802.11. It was written to eliminate 
some of the problems with 802.11 such as WEP and authentication. It uses IEEE 802.1x, a port 
based access control mechanism, for user authentication and encryption key distribution. IEEE 
802.11i improves encryption algorithms through the use of the temporal key integrity protocol 
(TKIP) and the counter mode with CBC=MAC protocol (CCMP). TKIP can be used with 
existing WLAN hardware and software upgrades. CCMP requires higher processing power and 
support for the advanced encryption standard (AES), which is available only in the latest WLAN 
hardware. [9]
802.1x restricts access to a network until the user has been authenticated by the network. 802.1x 
requires an authenticator, usually the AP in 802.11, a supplicant, the client in 802.11, and an 
authentication server that performs actual authentication of information provided by supplicant. 
The authentication server can be a separate device or reside in the authenticator.  
IEEE 802.11i and 802.1x are discussed in detail in another paper on WIDS.
2.8 Other
IEEE Std 802.11 presents a lot of information. This paper presents some of the details of the 
IEEE 802.11 architecture, services, states, messages, and frames needed to design the WIDS 
intrusion detection rules and actions. It does not attempt to summarize the IEEE Std 802.11. For 
more details, the reader can find the original IEEE Standards at 
http://standards.ieee.org/getieee802/portfolio.html.
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Chapter 3: Security problems in wireless networks
3.1 Ease of attack
Attacking a wireless network is easier than attacking a wired network. The radio signals of a 
wireless network often extend beyond the physical perimeter and can be picked up by anyone 
who has the correct hardware - a laptop computer and a wireless card are usually sufficient, and 
is close enough to the transmitter. A wireless network attacker does not have to be physically 
connected to the network through a wire. This eliminates an important security feature that is 
built into a wired network. 
Wireless cards with the Intersil PRISM chipset can operate in a monitor mode. A station in the 
monitor mode can show all frames regardless of destination address, source address, FCS result, 
or WEP decryption result. This allows potential attackers to passively listen to traffic on the 
wireless network and obtain information such as MAC addresses, IP addresses, and BSSIDS, 
which can be used in various attacks on the network.
Some of the attacks rely on the weakness in IEEE802.11 that once a station is authenticated, no 
more authentication of 802.11 frames is done. An intruder can send disassociate or deauthenticate 
frames to disassociate or deauthenticate someone else. They can be sent to a broadcast address or 
to individual stations or access points.
Other attacks listen to 802.11 frames in transit and gather information, which can be used in other 
programs to spoof authorized users and gain access to wireless networks. 802.11 access points 
send out beacons that are not encrypted and 802.11 frames can be easily changed by software. 
For example, iwconfig can change essid, and setmac in airjack or ifconfig can change MAC 
addresses.
3.2 Objectives of security
Security should protect the integrity, confidentiality, non-repudiation, and availability of data. 
These objectives are defined as follows [10]:
• Integrity – System: performs its intended function in an unimpaired manner, free from 
deliberate or inadvertent unauthorized manipulation of the system. Data: should be 
possible for receiver to verify that data has not been modified; intruder should not be able 
to substitute fake data.
• Confidentiality – Only intended recipient(s) should be able to read data.
• Non-repudiation –Sender should not be able to falsely deny sending data.
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• Availability – A third party with no access should not be able to block legitimate parties from 
using a resource. 
802.11 has failed in meeting all of the above objectives. An attacker can easily include false data 
in an 802.11 frame and send it to an access point. An attacker can see wireless data if he has a 
wireless card that can operate in a monitor mode. Falsifying data in 802.11 and TCP/IP frames 
allows an attacker to send data that appears to be from someone else, and the attacker can later 
deny sending it. WEP has been found to be insecure. Legitimate parties can be denied access as a 
result of denial of service attacks performed at the physical layer by jamming the radio signals or 
at the MAC sublayer by sending a flood of deauthenticate or disassociate frames.
3.3 Security services in IEEE 802.11
Authentication services and WEP provide the security services in IEEE 802.11. The security is 
limited and not sufficient to stop an attacker from obtaining unauthorized access to wireless 
networks. The attacker then has the ability to read, intercept, change, or inject messages; to 
decipher encrypted messages; to disrupt or end authorized sessions; and to deny access to 
authorized users.  
3.3.1 Weaknesses in authentication 
Open system authentication provides little security since any station requesting Open System 
authentication may become authenticated if the recipient station is set to Open System 
authentication. Shared key authentication using WEP provides limited security due to 
weaknesses in WEP that allow the secret key to be passively recovered. 
One approach to authentication, which is widely used but not required by IEEE 802.11, is MAC 
address filtering. The access point maintains a list of MAC addresses that are allowed to connect 
to the wireless LAN. During the connection process, the access point can check the station’s 
MAC address. If it is not on the access point’s list of MAC addresses, the station is not allowed 
to authenticate. The problem with Mac address filtering is that addresses identify stations, not 
users. It is very easy to monitor 802.11 frames in transit and recover valid MAC addresses. 
Software is available which can change a station’s MAC address. 
3.3.2 Weaknesses in WEP
Weaknesses in WEP are well documented. A paper by Nikita Borisov, Ian Goldberg, and David 
Wagner "Intercepting Mobile Communications: The Insecurity of 802.11" identified some 
problems with WEP due to key stream reuse and weak message authentication [11]. Jesse R 
Walker’s paper "Unsafe at any key size; an analysis of the WEP encapsulation" showed that 
WEP is insecure regardless of the key size because of a weakness in WEP’s initialization vector 
[12].  A paper by Scott Fluhrer, Itsik Mantin, and Adi Shamir, "Weaknesses in the Key 
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Scheduling Algorithm of RC4," identifies weaknesses in the key scheduling algorithm and shows 
that rc4 is insecure in WEP. The authors describe but do not implement a passive cipher text 
only attack to recover a secret key [13]. Adam Stubblefield, John Ioannidis, and Aviel D. Rubin 
implemented the attack described by Fluhrer, Mantin, and Shamir and were able to recover a 128 
bit secret key in a production network. Their implementation is described in their paper "Using 
the Fluhrer, Mantin, and Shamir Attack to Break WEP [14]." 
3.4 Types of attacks
There are several basic types of attacks – network discovery, eavesdropping, man in the middle 
attacks, denial of service attacks, and WEP key cracking. Attacks can be either active or passive.
3.4.1 Network discovery 
The purpose of network discovery attacks is to find access points and obtain information about 
the network. Network discovery can do this actively or passively.
Software available for network discovery:
Netstumbler - actively discovers networks that broadcast their SSID by sending probe 
requests and receiving probe responses. Netstumbler displays the MAC address, SSID, 
name, channel, encryption and other information about access points. Global Positioning 
System (GPS) support is built in.
Wellenreiter - wireless card must be in monitor mode. It displays statistics, MAC address, 
WEP, and other data for ESSID of broadcasting and non-broadcasting networks. Wellenreiter 
requires the linux wlan-ng driver. GPS support is built in.
Kismet - wireless card must be in monitor mode. Kismet_server identifies name, BSSID 
(MAC address), WEP, channel and other information for networks.
3.4.2 Eavesdropping
Eavesdropping attacks listen to messages in transit and display the message data and/or save the 
message data to a file. Eavesdropping is also known as sniffing.   
Software available for eavesdropping attacks:
Ethereal – wireless card must be in monitor mode for 802.11 frames. It shows a summary 
line, a protocol tree, and a hex dump. The protocol tree has a drill down function that 
provides details of the protocol fields.
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Kismet – wireless card must be in monitor mode. It separates and identifies different wireless 
networks in the area. It saves data in a file format that can be read by ethereal. 
HostAP - wireless card must be in monitor mode.  HostAP has a sniffer called wlansniff, 
which displays 802.11frame information.
3.4.3 Man in the middle attack (MITM)
In a man in the middle attack, stations connect to a rogue access point instead of the intended 
access point. The rogue access point intercepts data sent to/from the station from/to the intended 
access point. The rogue access point can read, change, or insert data.
Software available for man in the middle attacks:
monkey jack - Requires air jack driver. Forces target to deathenticate from real access point 
and reassociate with attacking machine. The attacking machine associates with the real access 
point.
kracker-jack - Requires air jack driver. Improves monkey-jack to perform MITM attacks on 
IPsec connections.
Ettercap - an Address Resolution Protocol (ARP) attack. Ettercap can change the IP/MAC 
address combination in the target’s ARP cache to allow a MITM attack.
3.4.4 Denial of service attacks (DOS)
Denial of services attacks prevent users from accessing network resources. This is usually 
accomplished by flooding the network with faulty packets or messages that keep out legitimate 
traffic. Jamming of radio signals can also be used as a DOS attack.
Several papers on DOS attacks are worth mentioning because of the significance of the effects of 
attack or the methods used in performing the attack. The first two papers describe attacks for 
which there is no defense. The third paper describes an attack that alters fields overwritten by 
the card’s firmware.
In August 2004, researchers at Queensland University of Technology, Brisbane, Australia [15] 
discovered a weakness in the 802.11b standards that can be used to launch a DOS attack against 
wireless devices using 802.11b and DSSS. A test mode can be used to continually send a DSSS 
signal on a target channel to prevent the transmission of data from all access points and stations 
within range. The attack causes the wireless device’s Clear Channel Assessment (CCA) to report 
that the medium is always busy and consequently prohibiting the transmission of data. The 
attack targets the DSSS method used by 802.11b and 802.11g operating in mixed mode.
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At the present time there is no defense against this type of attack other than not using 802.11b 
devices. The researchers state that 802.11b networking equipment can not be used to detect this 
attack because the monitor itself can be targeted. More expensive, specialized RF monitoring 
hardware may be needed for detection. The IEEE 802.11i standard will not prevent this attack 
since the attack operates at the Physical Layer Convergence Protocol (PLCP) layer and 802.11i 
protects MAC layer Protocol Data Units (PDUs).
A similar DOS attack used an $89.00 ATV transmitter operating in the same bandwidth as 
802.11b and a 14dB gain directional grid antenna to send Radio Frequency Interference (RFI) to 
an access point [16]. The RFI causes the CCA to report that the current channel is busy just as 
the continuous DSSS signal did in the Australian attack. 
A paper on DOS was presented at the 12th USENIX Security Symposium, August 4-8, 2003 
[17]. The authors successfully performed DOS attacks by sending a spoofed deauthentication 
frame to an access point each time a data or association frame was received from a target station. 
The attack was carried out using an iPAQ H3600 Pocket PC and a Dlink DWL-650 PCMCIA 
wireless card. They also attempted a DOS attack that exploits vulnerability in the Network 
Allocation Vector (NAV), but it was unsuccessful due to the wireless cards improperly 
implementing the 802.11 MAC specifications. An interesting part of the NAV attack is that the 
authors figured out how to modify a frame after the firmware has processed it, but before it is 
sent. Thus, any field that is overwritten by the firmware can be altered before it is transmitted.
 
Altering fields overwritten by the firmware is significant because other intrusion detection 
methods analyze the sequence numbers, which are overwritten by the firmware, to identify 
frames generated by FakeAP and Airjack and MAC address spoofing [6]. If the sequence 
numbers can be changed, those detection methods will no longer work.
Software capable of performing DOS attacks
 
Wlan-jack - deauthentication request flood. Requires airjack driver
Void11 - association/authentication request flood
Fata-jack - sends invalid authentication requests to access point
FakeAP - flood area with beacon packets looking like hundreds of access points
3.4.5 WEP key cracking
WEP key cracking recovers the secret key used for encryption
Software capable of performing WEP key cracking attacks
14
AirSnort - Implementation of the Fluhrer, Mantin, and Shamir attack on WEP keys exploiting 
the weaknesses in the key scheduling algorithm of RC4. It requires 5 – 10 million encrypted 
packets [18]. It can break 40 bit or 128 bit keys. AirSnort requires a card that can operate in 
the monitor mode. 
WEPcrack – Another implementation of the Fluhrer, Mantin, and Shamir attack on WEP 
keys.
3.4.6 Other
Impersonation or spoofing a valid station or access point in order to gain unauthorized access to 
the wireless network often uses information obtained from some of the above attacks, or it is part 
of an attack such as a MITM. Consequently, I did not list it as a separate type of attack.  
3.5 Need for Security
As can be seen from the above discussion, an unprotected 802.11 network is vulnerable to many 
different kinds of attacks and it can sometimes be used as an entry point to a wired network as in 
the Lowe’s department store case mentioned in the introduction. Some kind of security or 
intrusion detection system should be used to protect sensitive data on a wireless network. WIDS 
can provide extra security to protect wireless 802.11b networks.
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Chapter 4: Description of WIDS system
4.1 General description
The insecurities inherent in a wireless (no absolute or readily observable boundaries) coupled 
with the weaknesses in 802.11b security (authorization and WEP) make the use of 802.11b 
networks risky in places where a high level of security is needed.
WIDS is designed to strengthen the security of an internal wireless network by surrounding the 
physical perimeter of the network with special access points to detect and locate intruders. Radio 
signals from a wireless network extend out past the physical perimeter of the network and can be 
received by anyone with the correct equipment. Using information obtained about the wireless 
network from eavesdropping or by other means, a potential intruder could gain access to the 
wireless network and possibly a wired network behind the wireless network. There are situations 
when an entity may not want someone outside of the perimeter of the wireless network to have 
access to the network. Possible users of WIDS are military bases, ships in port, corporations 
with sensitive data, etc. 
Authorized users connect to the internal network APs from within the perimeter. WIDS assumes 
that internal security procedures handle authentication inside the perimeter. Using the 
assumption that a station will associate with the access point from which it receives the strongest 
signal, a potential intruder outside the perimeter would associate with a WIDS access point 
(WIDS AP) on the perimeter and not with an access point in the internal network. The WIDS 
system would then locate the intruder using the directional antennas on two or more access 
points. Even if an intruder was able to associate with the internal access point from beyond the 
perimeter, the WIDS AP system directional antennas should still be able to locate the intruder, 
because WIDS can work with signals it picks up and association with a WIDS AP is not 
necessary.
WIDS is designed to give the user control over how it is applied. The user can decide that all 
stations outside the perimeter are intruders or that some stations outside the perimeter are 
authorized to connect to the WIDS APs or the internal network APs. Another possibility is for 
the WIDS APs to be used as honeypots that allow intruders to associate so that an intruder’s 
activities can be monitored or the intruder can be given false or misleading data. The honeypot 
scenario is not implemented as part of this paper.
WIDS APs use a set of rules to identify potential intruders. The rules can search for known 
attack fingerprints or search according to user defined criteria based on the data in the signal 
(MAC address, IP header information, application data, etc.). The rules and the fact that WIDS 
contains access points give WIDS the ability to actively respond to identified threats. Each 
WIDS AP is equipped with a directional antenna which points outward and sweeps in a 
16
preconfigured arc searching for wireless users. The WIDS AP determines if the remote station is 
an intruder and it contacts a controlling computer. Other nearby WIDS APs are reconfigured by 
the controller to modify their areas of coverage. Bearings from multiple WIDS APs are used by 
the controller to pinpoint the location of the intruder. The rules can trigger actions to interact 
with the intruder such as denying access, ignoring frames, reacting to IP header data, etc. 
4.2 WIDS architecture
The WIDS architecture consists of one or more WIDS access points connected to a centralized 
controller via a standard wired network. The wired network provides a more secure management 
of the WIDS AP’s than a wireless network.
WIDS APs use an open-source access point code, HostAP and Linux. HostAP allows an 802.11b 
wireless Prism 2/2.5 Ethernet card to be used as an access point instead of a remote station. 
HostAP has been extended to include the additional functions needed by WIDS. The controller is 
a personal computer running Linux. The controller software is written in Perl-TK. 
We investigated several designs and configurations for the WIDS AP hardware and decided that it 
should be an embedded computer equipped with a rotating directional antenna. The WIDS AP 
would be built from components including an X-Scale single board computer and wireless 
networking platform, a directional antenna, a stepper motor to rotate the antenna, and a stepper 
motor controller. A list of the components is presented in the Appendix of this paper. 
Unfortunately, we were not able to obtain financing to build a fully functional WIDS AP 
equipped with the rotating antenna. A laptop computer without a rotating directional antenna 
was used in our implementation.  
Since some 802.11 frames that are handled by the Prism 2/2.5’s firmware when in hostAP can 
only be captured by a wireless card in monitor mode, a configuration with two Prism 2/2.5 cards, 
one in hostAP mode and one in monitor mode provides WIDS with more intrusion detection 
capabilities. The card in the monitor mode can capture data, control, and the management frames 
that are handled by the card’s firmware and pass them to the modified HostAP software for 
processing and testing. The card in the monitor mode can also receive the hfa384x transaction 
frames that show time, signal, silence and rate.  
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WIDS access point
Internal access point
Station (possible intruder)
Orientation of a WIDS AP attached directional antenna
Estimates of an intruder’s location
Figure 4: WIDS architecture
Figure 4 depicts four WIDS access points, arranged vertically on the left, protecting an internal 
wireless network installed in an arena. Only one side of a WIDS installation is shown in order to 
keep the picture simple. (A complete WIDS installation would include WIDS AP’s on all four 
sides of the arena.) The WIDS access points connect to a controller computer via a wired 
network. The controller can be located inside the perimeter. The arena contains six access points 
depicted as green circles emanating larger green circles. The larger green circles represent the 
signals transmitted by the AP’s.  Blue arrows originating from each WIDS access point show the 
current orientation of an attached directional antenna. The other gray lines extending from two of 
the WIDS access points represent station signals picked up by the directional antennas. The red 
lines represent bearings on the station and a red square indicates the location of a station.
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4.3 WIDS attack defenses
If WIDS allows authorized users to associate with the WIDS APs or the WIDS APs are used as 
honeypots, then WIDS needs to protect the APs from the types of attacks mentioned in Chapter 
3. This section discusses how WIDS identifies and handles some of those attacks.
4.3.1 Network discovery and eavesdropping
The WIDS AP antennas would not pick up network discovery and eavesdropping that are done 
passively. If network discovery or eavesdropping is done actively by sending probes or beacons, 
a WIDS AP with a card operating in the monitor mode could detect the 802.11 frames and 
identify the attack based on known fingerprints of the attacking software. 
4.3.2 Man in the middle attack (MITM)
Man in the middle attacks need at least two devices in addition to the WIDS AP. Since one 
station masquerades as the other station, they will both send the same MAC address. The WIDS 
APs should pick up signals from both stations, even though only one station associates with the 
WIDS AP. If the two stations are picked up by different WIDS APs, the positions could be 
computed for each device in the normal manner. If the stations are in the same WIDS AP 
coverage area, the method used to compute the maximum signal strength position may need to 
distinguish the readings from each device using sequence control numbers or some other criteria. 
4.3.3 Denial of service attacks (DOS) 
If the DOS attack is a result of a flood of deauthenticate or disassociate frames, the HostAP 
software could keep track of how often they are received. A rule containing information such as 
“if x number of deauthenticate or disassociate frames are received in y time period, do not accept 
the deauthenticate or disassociate frame” could be implemented. 
With regards to the attacks mentioned in section 3.4.4 that cause the CCA to report that the 
medium is always busy, it is not easy to determine how a WIDS AP would respond without 
reproducing the attack. The WIDS AP communicates with the WIDS controller via a wired 
medium so the attacks would not affect their communications. If the WIDS APs are able to 
interpret the signal strength of the jamming signal and report data similar to that of normal 
802.11b DSSS frames, the controller should be able to locate the attacker. If the signal consists of 
noise that is not decipherable by the WIDS APs, then the WIDS would not be able to take a 
bearing on the attacker’s position.
4.3.4 WEP key cracking
The WIDS APs use open system authentication and do not normally use WEP. However, if 
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WEP is used and an attacker is passively trying to crack WEP, the WIDS AP antennas would not 
pick up the attacking equipment since no radio signals are sent out from the attacking device. 
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Chapter 5: Feasibility of WIDS
5.1 Locating intruders
Researchers at Interlink networks performed some experiments with 802.11 cards and access 
points and documented their results in a paper [19]. The purpose of their research and paper was 
to determine if it is possible to detect and locate unauthorized wireless clients and rogue access 
points with off the shelf components and free software. Using a Lucent Orinoco card in monitor 
mode, tcpdump and ethereal, the researchers were able to detect when a wireless card was 
powered on within range of a local network, a rogue access point and unauthorized clients. 
The paper discussed several methods of locating an unauthorized client. One was to use a 
directional antenna and scan an area for the strongest signal, move the antenna and scan the area 
again for the strongest signal and use simple trigonometry to determine the location. Many 
factors can affect the signal such as terrain, obstructions, reflection, refraction, and atmospheric 
conditions. The result of these factors is that the apparent location of the strongest signal may 
not be the location of the signal. The researchers considered more discussion on this topic to be 
beyond the scope of their paper and no experiments were done using this method. However, the 
researchers believe the basic theory is sound and can be an effective technique to locate a 
transmitter. 
Another method to locate a transmitter is to use the relative signal strength at several locations 
around the area, and if known, the propagation losses and the power of the transmitter. The first 
step is to compute distance vs. signal strength trends to predict the signal strength drop off rate 
and derive an equation to approximate indoor losses at 2.4 GHz. The next step is to write the 
distance-power approximation equation as a function of a position (x,y) and the unknown 
coordinates (A,B) of the transmitter and an unknown constant C where C is related to the 
transmitter’s output power.
Using a combination of experimental data and research on indoor radio propagation, the 
researchers derived the equations described above and tested their equations using three access 
points in an office suite with an area of approximately 30 by 20 meters. Three tests were 
presented in the paper. The results of two of the tests computed a location within a couple of 
meters of the actual position, but the third test computed a location that differed from the actual 
location by about eight meters. The researchers concluded that the basic theory is sound and that 
more careful data gathering and more data points would probably give better results. These 
results address locating an intruder within an indoor space. 
Another paper by Frank Adelstein, Prasanth Alla, Rob Joyce and Golden G. Richard III [20] 
documents attempts to locate an intruding wireless station. In this paper the authors locate an 
intruder’s position by rotating a directional antenna 360 degrees while monitoring signal strength. 
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An antenna’s signature is computed ahead of time and the intruder’s location is computed by 
comparing the intruder’s data to the signature data.
Experiments were done with three different types of directional antennas. The test antenna was 
mounted on a telescope tripod and connected to a portable WIDS access point consisting of a 
laptop running Linux and HostAP. The antenna’s signature was computed by placing an intruder 
machine a few hundred feet away from the WIDS access point. The intruder associated with the 
WIDS access point. The directional antenna was rotated in fixed increments and the signal 
strength value was recorded. Readings were taken over a 360 degree range.  
In order to compute the location of an intruder, several readings of the intruder’s signal strength 
data were made at different angles of the WIDS access point antenna. The intruder’s data was 
correlated with the signature data and the computed angle is the angle with the best fit to the 
known signature data. Two different locations of the WIDS access point were used. The results 
of the tests computed the location of the intruder within 2 to 4 degrees. The intruder’s location 
was computed using triangulation with the computed angles and access point locations. 
The research showed that it is possible to determine the intruder’s location with reasonable 
accuracy using low priced off the shelf hardware and free software.
5.1.1 Comparison of WIDS and above experiments
  
The WIDS system is designed to operate with free software and off the shelf or slightly modified 
equipment. The above research shows that it is possible to locate 802.11 stations using free 
software and off the shelf or slightly modified equipment.
While the research in the first paper showed that it is possible to detect unauthorized clients and 
rogue access points, it has several deficiencies that need to be addressed by an intrusion detection 
system such as WIDS. One is that detection is not done in real time. The packets are captured to 
a file and analyzed later with ethereal. Another is that the wireless card used for detection is in 
monitor mode and it doesn’t communicate with the intruder or access point. Those deficiencies 
make it difficult to take action against an unauthorized user on a timely basis. The unauthorized 
user could connect to the wireless network, do whatever he wants and disconnect before anyone 
knows he was there. Also, the intruder was located in an interior space and WIDS is concerned 
with locating intruders in external locations. The second paper locates intruders in external 
locations but requires plenty of data collection for each access point. 
WIDS is designed to use rotating directional antennas that scan an area for the strongest signal. 
With data from two access points with directional antennas, trigonometry can be used to 
determine the location. This is the method discussed in the first paper but not implemented. 
Since no directional antennas were available due to lack of funds, it was not possible to test the 
WIDS method for locating intruders.
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5.2 Intersil Prism  2/2.5 802.11b wireless cards and HostAP driver
The WIDS access points require a wireless card using the Intersil PRISM 2/2.5 radio chipset. The 
PRISM Medium Access Controller (PRISM MAC) has two major operating modes for 
supporting access points: firmware based or host-based. The advantage of using a host-based 
access point is that the developer of the host access point software is able to implement optional 
features. The WIDS access point software needs additional features to control the sweeping 
directional antenna, apply a set of intrusion detection rules, and communicate with the WIDS 
controller. Our approach to implementing the WIDS access point software modifies the host-
based access point driver HostAP. 
5.2.1 PRISM 2/2.5 Host-based Access Point Mode
In the PRISM 2/2.5 host-based access point mode, the host software performs many functions 
required to maintain a Basic Service Set (BSS). These functions include authentication, 
deauthentication, association, reassociation, disassociation, data transmission between two 
wireless stations, and all power save queuing. When in host access point mode (hostAP), station 
firmware performs only packet transfer and low level 802.11 MAC management. Frame 
transmission, frame reception and beacon/probe response transmission are implemented in the 
firmware due to their time critical nature. The remainder of the access point operations is 
performed by the host software. The firmware acts as a frame pipe that transmits 802.11 frames 
from the host and receives 802.11 frames and passes them to the host. The hostAP mode is 
enabled by setting the PortType for station firmware to hostAP.
For transmitted frames, the host specifies the Protocol Version, Type, Subtype, To DS, From 
Ds, Pwr Mgt, More Data, WEP, and Order sub fields and the firmware provides the More Frag 
and Retry subfields of the frame control field. The firmware fills in the Frame Control, Address 
2, and Sequence Control fields of the MAC frame.
5.2.2 The PRISM MAC communications frame structure
The PRISM MAC communications frame structure consists of control fields, header information, 
and data segments. The control fields segment contains frame processing and status information 
and it is handled by the PRISM MAC controller. The header information and the data segments 
are transferred to the host. The control fields for a Transmit Frame Structure are the Status, 
SwSupport, TxRate, RetryCount, TxControl fields. The control fields for a Receive Frame 
Structure are the Status, Timestamp, Signal, Silence, and Rate fields.
The PRISM MAC frame structure handles both 802.3 and 802.11 header formats. A transmit 
frame structure can contain the header info in either 802.3 or 802.11 format. If the header is an 
802.3 header, the PRISM MAC expands it into an 802.11 header. A receive frame structure 
contains the header info in 802.11 and 802.3 formats. 
23
If higher software layers can handle 802.11 frame formats, the host software uses the 802.11 
format part of the header info. If higher software layers assume an 802.3 frame format, the 
PRISM MAC handles the differences between the 802.11 and the 802.3 frame formats without 
involving the host software.
5.2.3 Monitor Mode
The PRISM 2/2.5 cards can operate in a non-standard monitor mode. The monitor mode is 
intended to be used for testing and debugging operations. However, it can also be used to monitor 
wireless networks.  If a station is operating in monitor mode, all frames where the physical layer 
convergence protocol (PLCP) header and the beginning of the frame are successfully received are 
passed to the host regardless of destination address, source address, FCS result, or WEP 
decryption result
5.2.4 HostAP software
HostAP [21] is a Linux driver for wireless LAN cards based on Intersil's PRISM 2/2.5 chipset. It 
implements the host-based access point functions discussed above. In addition, the HostAP 
driver has various features for development and debugging in IEEE 802.11 environments, 
including access to hardware configuration records, I/O registers, and frames with 802.11 headers.
HostAP includes a utility sniff, for monitoring activities. Sniff shows the data from the 
PRISM2/2.5 RX frames and the 802.11 frames. HostAP can operate in a kernel module or a user 
space daemon. WIDS uses the user space daemon.
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Chapter 6: Software implementation of WIDS
6.1 WIDS Access Point/Controller Protocol
The WIDS access points and the controller communicate over TCP, using the WIDS Access 
Point/Controller Protocol. This section presents a summary of the communications between 
access points and the controller. Access Point/Controller Protocol message types are printed in 
upper case letters.
An access point starts up and attempts to connect to the controller using sockets. If the access 
point is unable to connect, it retries every 5 seconds. When a connection is made, the access 
point sends a HELLO message to the controller and waits for a response. The HELLO message 
contains the name of the access point and its location. The controller replies with a CONFIG 
message containing the beginning and ending sweep positions for the antenna, the report rate for 
sending data to the controller and the intrusion detection rules to be used by the access point. 
The antenna begins sweeping and listening for signals. The report rate specifies how often the 
access point sends REPORT messages to the controller. The REPORT message contains the 
access point name, the position (angle) of the antenna, the sweep direction, the time, the signal 
strength received at that position, and the MAC address of the station sending the signal. 
When a signal is received which has the maximum signal strength in a specified number of 
readings, the access point sends a POSITION message to the controller. The POSITION message 
contains the access point name, the position of the antenna when the maximum signal strength 
was received, the MAC address of the station sending the signal and whether or not the station is 
associated with the reporting access point. 
The controller maintains a hash of POSITIONS received. The keys are the MAC addresses of the 
stations and the values are strings containing the name of the access point that sent the 
POSITION message, an integer indicating whether or not the access point and the station are 
associated, and another integer indicating whether or not the station has been located.
When a POSITION message is received by the controller, the controller checks the hash for the 
MAC address. If it is not found, the controller adds it to the hash, and checks if the station is 
associated with the reporting access point. If it is associated, the controller determines which 
neighboring access point needs to be reconfigured and sends a RECONFIG message with 
reconfigured antenna sweep information to the applicable access point.
If the MAC address is in the hash, the controller checks the hash value to determine if the station 
has already been located or if a POSITION message from the same access point with the same 
information has been previously received. If so, the controller does nothing. If the MAC is in the 
hash with a different access point and has not been located, the controller will use the information 
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from both access points to compute the station’s location. The hash is updated to show that this 
station has been located.
The controller will display a warning message if the same MAC address is associated with more 
than one access point. This may be an indication that MAC address spoofing has occurred.
When an access point receives a RECONFIG message, it changes the starting sweep position or 
the ending sweep position in accordance with the RECONFIG message. The antenna sweeps to 
the new position twice and then returns to its original sweep configuration.
The controller operator can send messages to an access point to change the intrusion detection 
rules or to collect statistics related to a station associated with the access point. A 
CHANGERULES message is sent to change the intrusion detection rules. When the access point 
receives a CHANGERULES message, it destroys its current rule tree and processes the new rules 
sent by the controller. A STATS message is sent to gather statistics from an access point. The 
access point returns a STATS message containing a list of stations associated with it in response 
to the controller’s STATS message. The controller operator selects a station and sends a MAC 
message with the station’s MAC address. The access point reads the applicable 
/proc/net/hostap/wlan0/MAC address file and sends the stats info back to the controller in a 
MACST message. The controller receives the MACST message, opens a new window and 
displays the stats. 
The access point can send a LOGDATA message to the controller. When the controller receives a 
LOGDATA message, it writes the message to the controller’s log file.
6.2 Intrusion Detection Rules
Each 802.11b frame received by a HostAP access point which is not handled by the wireless 
card’s firmware can be tested with a set of intrusion detection rules. If the access point also has a 
wireless card operating in the monitor mode, all 802.11b frame received can be tested with the 
rules. The results of the rules tests are intended to identify potential intruders.
A rule has the format type-subtype, a test list consisting of one or more pairs of test and test 
data, and one pair of action and action data. The type-subtype is the 802.11 frame type-subtype, 
the test is one of the tests defined in the WIDS AP software, the test data is data used in the test, 
the action is one is one of the actions defined in the WIDS AP software, and the action data gives 
more information about the action. The action is performed only if all of the tests in the rule are 
true. 
The type-subtype, test list, and action are separated by ‘,’. The test list is enclosed by ‘(‘ and 
‘)’. The test keyword and test data are separated by a ‘:’. The end of a test keyword test data 
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pair is designated by an ‘!’. An action consists of an action keyword and action data pair. The 
action keyword is separated from the action data by a ‘:’. 
The test keyword generally describes an operation on a field in the 802.11 or the IP frame, such 
as SOURCE_MAC_EQUALS for source MAC address equals, TTL_LESS_THAN for time to 
live is less than, or FLAG_PWRMGMT for power management is on or off. The value to be 
tested is given by the rule’s test data. Sample test data for test keywords are 00022D2E5C6a for 
SOURCE_MAC_EQUALS, 64 for TTL_LESS_THAN and OFF for FLAG_PWRMGMT.
An example of a rule is:
"MGMT_ASREQ, (SOURCE_MAC_EQUALS:00022D2E5C6a! FLAG_WEP:OFF!), 
LOG, assoc request from 00:02:2D:2E:5D:6a  flag wep off" 
This rule is testing an association request. It is true if the source MAC address is 
00:02:2D:2E:5C:6a and the wep flag is 0. If the rule is true, the WIDS AP will send a message to 
the controller, which displays the message in a terminal window and logs the message in a file. 
The message includes the WIDS AP name, date and time of message, and the action data "assoc 
request from 00:02:2D:2E:5D:6a  flag wep off."
6.3 Changes/additions to HostAP files
6.3.1 Changes to HostAP files
The first step in implementing WIDS in HostAP is to modify the struct hostapd_data in 
hostapd.h to include information for the directional antenna, the location of the access point, and 
the shared memory. HostAP defines the typedef hostapd for the struct hostapd_data. 
Information added to hostapd_data is:
      int controller_sock;          /* socket for controller*/
      int beginsweep;          /* begin sweep position of directional antenna */
      int endsweep;          /* end sweep position of directional antenna */
      int position;          /* sweep position of directional antenna */
      int x;          /* x coordinate of access point location */
      int y;          /* y coordinate of access point location */
      int reportrate;          /* frequency of reporting to controller */
      int direction;                   /* direction of antenna sweep-clockwise, counterclockwise */
      int semid;          /* semaphore id */
      int shmid;                /* shared memory id */
      char *shm_ptr;                /* pointer to shared memory */
      struct sharedinfo *shared_ptr;   /* pointer to shared memory data struct*/ 
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The sharedinfo structure holds the data shared between the hostapd process and the IP packet 
monitoring process. It is:
struct sharedinfo{
      u8 ttl; /* time to live */
                u8 src_mac[6]; /* source MAC address*/
                u8 dest_mac[6]; /* destination MAC address*/
                u16 seq_number; /* sequence number and fragment number*/
                u32 test; /* rule test to be performed */
                int testmac; /* MAC address tested */
                pid_t pid; /* parent process id */
               struct rule_node *ruledetail; /* rule */
               char message[MESSAGE_SIZE];   /* additional info, if needed */
         };
The struct sta_info in ap.h also has to be modified to include information about the directional 
antenna. Additions are:
        int count;        /* number of completed sweeps */
        int x; /* x coordinate of access point location */
        int y; /* y coordinate of access point location */
        int angle; /* sweep position of directional antenna */
        int signal; /* signal strength */
        int widsassociated; /* associated with wids controller */
        time_t *gmt; /* time */
The hostapd configuration file must be changed to include information needed by the access point 
at start up. This information includes names of files to be read, name and location of log file, 
name of access point, location of the access point, and IP addresses and ports used by the access 
point and the controller. A sample of the information added to the configuration file is given 
below:
valid_mac_file=ouitxt.txt1   /* file containing valid OUI numbers for MAC addresses */ 
rules_hash_file=80211a.txt   /* file containing key(integer) value(text) pairs for rules */
log=log.new                       /* name of log file for access point logging */
log_directory=/home/jvigo/
            hostap-0.0.3/hostapd2new      /* directory of log file */
ipaddress=127.0.0.1          /* access point IP address */    
port=7000                    /* access point port */
apname=HOSTAP                /* access point name */
cipaddress=192.168.1.2       /* controller IP address */
cport=7777      /* controller port */
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x=420      /* x coordinate of access point location */
y=350      /* y coordinate of access point location */
Changes to programs config.h and config.c are needed to handle the above additions to the 
configuration file. In config.h the struct hostapd_config is modified to include character pointers 
for each of the above items and config.c is expanded to include code to read the new items 
included in the configuration file.
The controller needs to know all of the stations associated with an access point, so a function 
char * ap_list_sta_str(hostapd *hapd) is added to sta_info.c. This function returns a string of all 
the associated stations for a particular access point.
In order to keep modifications to HostAP files at a minimum, functionality was put into separate 
files and calls to the functions were inserted into the HostAP files where necessary. The function 
calls inserted into the main function in hostapd.c initialize the shared memory, connect to the 
controller, open a log file, and load the hash tables for the MAC addresses and the rule 
descriptions. Some changes were made to the signal handling functions for SIGTERM and 
SIGINT, and a new function was written which is called when a SIGUSR2 signal is received. The 
file eloop.c, which contains the run loop called by main in hostapd.c, was modified to include a 
call to antenna_ap() in client.c. antenna_ap() handles the directional antenna.
The next step was to modify HostAP files to apply the intrusion detection rules. Management 
type/subtype rules are handled by adding a call to applyRules(struct ieee80211_mgmt *mgmt, 
hostapd *hapd) in each of the following functions in ieee802_11.c.
static void handle_auth(…)
static void handle_assoc(...)
static void handle_assoc_resp(...)
static void handle_disassoc(...)
static void handle_deauth(...)
static void handle_beacon(...)
Control and data type/subtype rules are handled by adding calls to applyRules(...) to receive.c 
functions static void handle_frame(hostapd *hapd, char *buf, size_t len)  and  static void 
handle_data(hostapd *hapd, char *buf, size_t len, u16 stype).
A rule returns true if all of the rules criteria specified in the tests are met and false if one or more 
of the criteria are not met. When a rule tests IP packets and a true result is obtained, a SIGUSR2 
signal is sent by the process monitoring the IP packets to the HostAP process. The function 
packetresult() is called when a SIGUSR2 signal is received.
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6.3.2 New files added to HostAP
Several new files were written to handle operations not included in Hostap. These files are 
antenna.c, client.c, ruleslist.c, validmac.c and their related header files. 
6.3.2.1 antenna.c
The file antenna.c simulates antenna readings. Since there is no rotating directional antenna 
connected to the access point, antenna readings are read from an array where the array index 
represents the antenna position in degrees. Antenna.c tests the signal strength readings and finds 
the maximum signal strength within a range of readings reported by the sweeping directional 
antenna.
Some of the more important functions in antenna.c are:
6.3.2.1.1 void maxsignal (int position, int signal, struct pos_sig *max2){…}
Maxsignal finds the maximum signal strength in a range of signal readings. The number of readings 
needed by the antenna before a maximum signal strength can be determined is designated by the 
variable POINTS. The maximum signal strength is calculated when there are POINTS/2 signal 
readings with an increasing trend on one side of a location and POINTS/2 signal readings with a 
decreasing trend on the other side of  the same location. Temporary fluctuations in a range of 
increasing or decreasing signal strengths do not change the overall trend. For example, if signal 
strengths readings are 40, 42, 43, 41, 43, 44, the number of increasing signal readings is 6, since 41 
is considered a temporary fluctuation and the trend is still increasing.
More than one station in a WIDS AP’s coverage area can be simulated as long as the sets of 
POINTS used to compute each local maximum do not overlap. The algorithm to compute the 
maximum signal strength position assumes all signal readings in the range of POINTS come from 
the same station. In a real WIDS implementation, the algorithm could try to distinguish signals 
from different stations using MAC addresses or sequence numbers, although either of those could 
be spoofed by a knowledgeable attacker.
The maximum is stored in the struct pos_sig.
struct pos_sig{
     double slope;            /* angle position where slope of curve = 0*/
     double signal; /* signal strength */
};
In order to compute the location of the maximum signal strength, the equation of a parabola is 
determined using the least squares method and the signal strength readings in the range of 
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POINTS. The maximum signal strength location is the maximum point on the parabola that is the 
point where the slope of the parabola is equal to zero. The maximum signal strength calculation is 
performed by calling the function double slope ().
Figure 5: Signal Strength vs. Position
Slope() determines the matrices needed to solve the set of equations needed to fit a least squares 
parabola through a set of points which includes a maximum signal strength. Slope() calls the 
function  solve (a_data, b_data, parabola)  to get the equation of the parabola. Slope() then 
calculates the maximum point of the parabola by solving the equation where the derivative of the 
parabola equation equals zero and returns the maximum point. The derivative f ‘(a) = Slope of 
tangent line to the graph of f at the point (a, f(a)).
Applying the method of least squares to curvilinear relationships gives a regression equation of 
the form         
                _
                Yx = aX2 +bX + c 
                                                          _
which is the equation of a parabola. Yx represents the values obtained from the estimated 
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regression equation. The values of a,b,c may be determined from a solution of the equations [22]:
∑ X2Y = a ∑ X4 + b ∑ X3 + c ∑ X2  
            ∑ XY  = a ∑ X3 + b ∑ X2 + c ∑ X
∑ Y     = a ∑ X2 + b ∑ X  + nc
The equations can be written in matrix format as:
                                  
   
∑ X4  ∑ X3   ∑ X2           a           ∑ X2Y
∑ X3  ∑ X2   ∑ X      x     b    =     ∑ XY 
∑ X2  ∑ X    n                   c           ∑ Y    
   slope() stores equations in arrays as :
     a_data[0] = sumx4; /*  ∑ X4  */       
     a_data[1] = sumx3; /*  ∑ X3  */  
     a_data[2] = sumx2; /*  ∑ X2  */  
     a_data[3] = sumx3; /*  ∑ X3  */  
     a_data[4] = sumx2; /*  ∑ X2  */  
     a_data[5] = sumx; /*  ∑ X    */  
     a_data[6] = sumx2; /*  ∑ X2  */  
     a_data[7] = sumx; /*  ∑ X    */  
     a_data[8] = POINTS; /*  number of points */  
     b_data[0] = sumx2y; /*  ∑ X2Y */  
     b_data[1] = sumxy; /*  ∑ XY  */  
     b_data[2] = sumy; /*  ∑ Y     */  
     parabola[0] = a,
     parabola[1] = b,
     parabola[2] = c,
     
 and then calls
   solve (double a_data[], double b_data[], double parabola[])  
to compute a, b, and c.
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The derivative of the equation for the parabola ax2 +bx + c is 2ax + b and the maximum point in 
the parabola is the point x where the derivative = 0.
Slope() then solves the equation 2.0*parabola[0]*x + parabola[1] = 0 for x:
   x = -parabola[1] / (2.0 * parabola[0]);
6.3.2.1.2 void solve (double a_data[], double b_data[], double parabola[]){…}
The GNU Scientific Library (GSL) Linear Algebra library is used to solve the set of equations for 
the least squares parabola solution discussed above. It solves the linear system A x = b using LU 
decomposition of the matrix A.
The code for solve(double a_data[], double b_data[], double parabola[]) is taken from File: gsl-
ref.info,  Node: Linear Algebra Examples, in the GSL documentation.
void solve (double a_data[], double b_data[], double parabola[]){
     /* The solution is stored in  gsl_vector *x */
     int s;
     gsl_matrix_view m = gsl_matrix_view_array (a_data, 3, 3);
     gsl_vector_view b = gsl_vector_view_array (b_data, 3);
     gsl_vector *x = gsl_vector_alloc (3);
     gsl_permutation *p = gsl_permutation_alloc (3);
     gsl_linalg_LU_decomp (&m.matrix, p, &s);
     gsl_linalg_LU_solve (&m.matrix, p, &b.vector, x);
     gsl_permutation_free (p);
     parabola[0] = x->data[0];
     parabola[1] = x->data[1];
     parabola[2] = x->data[2];
}
Since there is no rotating directional antenna connected to the access point, the antenna readings 
must be simulated. When a station associates with an access point, the simulated antenna 
readings for that access point are read from a file into an array. The array index is the angle 
position in degrees. Valid angle values are –360 to 360. If an angle value is less than zero, a 
conversion factor is applied to it so that the array index is greater than or equal to zero.
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6.3.2.1.3 int fgetangles (char *angles[], int n1, char *name){…}
The function fgetangles reads simulated antenna data from the file ‘name’. The format for an 
antenna reading is degrees, signal strength, MAC address. The first number represents the angle 
in degrees. The second number represents the signal strength at that angle and the next 6 numbers 
represent the MAC address of the station transmitting the signal. Every two digits of the MAC 
address are separated by a ‘:’. Each reading in the file must be separated by ',' or '\n' and there 
must be a '\n' before the EOF character. Comments start with '#' and the '#' is allowed only at the 
start of a line. The following is a valid file for antenna readings.
File1:
-35,10;00:02:2D:2E:5C:61,-34,12;00:02:2D:2E:5C:61,-33,16;00:02:2D:2E:5C:61,-
32,20;00:02:2D:2E:5C:61,-31,23;00:02:2D:2E:5C:61,-30,25;00:02:2D:2E:5C:61,-
29,27;00:02:2D:2E:5C:61,-28,24;00:02:2D:2E:5C:61,-27,27;00:02:2D:2E:5C:61,-
26,28;00:02:2D:2E:5C:61,-25,29;00:02:2D:2E:5C:61,-24,26;00:02:2D:2E:5C:61,-
23,27;00:02:2D:2E:5C:61,-22,25;00:02:2D:2E:5C:61,-21,23;00:02:2D:2E:5C:61,-
20,20;00:02:2D:2E:5C:61,-19,16;00:02:2D:2E:5C:61,-18,14;00:02:2D:2E:5C:61,-
17,12;00:02:2D:2E:5C:61
The first antenna reading is angle = -35, signal strength is 10 and the MAC address of the station 
is 00:02:2D:2E:5C:61.
Simulation of an access point receiving signals from more than one station can be done by using 
multiple MAC addresses in the antenna data file. 
In a non-simulated environment with directional antennas HostAP can get signal strengths from 
the applicable /proc/net/hostap/wlan0/MAC address file or by using the Linux command iwspy 
from the wireless tools package [23]. If the WIDS AP has a wireless card in the monitor mode, 
HostAP can get the signal strength from the rx header. 
6.3.2.2 client.c
Client.c handles connecting to and communicating with the controller. It sends and receives 
messages to/from controller, reports the antenna’s position to the controller, and reports the 
antenna’s position with the maximum signal strength of a station to the controller. Client.c also 
does the simulated positioning of the directional antenna.
Some of the more important functions in client.c are:
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6.3.2.2.1 int  connectToController(hostapd *hapd){ …}
ConnectToController uses sockets to connect to the controller. The access point name and the 
controller IP address and port are given in the hostapd.conf file and stored in the typedef struct 
hostapd. When there is a successful connection with the controller, client.c calls the eloop.c 
function  eloop_register_read_sock(int sock, void (*handler)(int sock, void *eloop_ctx, void 
*sock_ctx), void *eloop_data, void *user_data){…} with the socket file descriptor, 
handleControllerMessage, hapd, and NULL as arguments to register handleControllerMessage as 
a handler for read events. 
6.3.2.2.2 int associate(hostapd *hapd, struct sta_info *sta){…}
When a station associates with a HostAP access point, associate(…)calls the function 
getantennareadings(hapd->beginsweep) to read the simulated antenna data and writes a message 
to the access point log which lists the access point name, the date and time, the MAC address of 
the station and the station’s wireless card type. A sample message is:
HOSTAP Thu Aug 26 02:48:20 2004 associated with 00:0d:88:4b:e0:d6 wireless card 
D:Link Corporation
The HostAP access point sends the same message to the controller.
6.3.2.2.3 void notifyController(int sock,char buffer1[], hostapd *hapd) {…}
NotifyController sends HELLO message to controller and waits for response.
6.3.2.2.4 static void handleControllerMessage(int sock, void *eloop_ctx, void *sock_ctx) 
{…}
When a message is received from the controller, HostAP’s run loop function calls 
handleControllerMessage with the socket file descriptor and two void pointers  *eloop_ctx and 
*sock_ctx as arguments. HandleControllerMessage(…) casts *eloop_ctx as a *hostapd, 
inintializes a buffer, and calls int recmesg(int fd, char buffer1[], hostapd *hapd) to read and 
process the message.
6.3.2.2.5 void antenna_ap(struct hapd_interfaces *ha){…}
Antenna_ap(…) handles the simulated positioning of the directional antenna and reporting the 
position to the controller. Each pass through the HostAP run loop calls antenna_ap(…) to move 
the directional antenna to its next position and reports the new position to controller, change 
sweep direction if necessary, return reconfigured sweep positions to normal if necessary, and call 
testantenna(…) in antenna.c to check if a maximum signal strength reading has been found. If so, 
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it calls the function void sendapfound(hostapd *hapd, struct pos_sig *sig, char macStr[]) to 
notify the controller of the antenna’s position with the maximum signal strength reading and the 
MAC address of the station sending the signal. 
6.3.2.2.6 int sendmesg(const char *arg,...){…}
Sendmesg(...) sends a message to controller. Sendmesg() takes a variable argument list of const 
char *arg. The last word of arguments must be 'done.' 
6.3.2.2.7 int recmesg(int fd, char buffer1[], hostapd *hapd){…}
Recmesg(…) reads and processes a message received from controller. 
6.3.2.3 ruleslist.h 
The ruleslist.h and ruleslist.c files are the longest and most important files added to HostAP. 
Ruleslist.c processes the intrusion detection rules received from the controller and stores them in 
a tree data structure. When an 802.11 frame is received, ruleslist.c searches the tree for rules with 
matching type-subtype. If a rule is found, ruleslist.c performs the tests contained in the rule. If 
the results of the tests are true, ruleslist.c performs the action in the rule. Ruleslist.h defines the 
rule tests and actions key words and the structs used to hold the rules and the rule tree nodes. 
Ruleslist.h also contains the HostAP struct ieee80211_mgmt. 
  
The struct rule_test holds a rule test. It is:
struct rule_test{
     int test; /* test keyword integer value */ 
     char test_data1[TEST_DATA_SIZE]; /* additional info for test */
     struct rule_test *next; /* next test for this rule */
};
The struct rule_node holds a rule. It is:
struct rule_node{
        int protocol; /* only 802.11 has been implemented */
        int type_subtype;       /* 802.11 type/subtype */
        struct rule_test test_struct; /* rule test */
        int action; /* action to take if test result is true */
        char action_data1[ACTION_DATA_SIZE];  /* action description */
        struct rule_node *prev; /* previous rule node */
        struct rule_node *next; /* next rule node */
};
36
The type-subtype field in rule node can contain a type only, management, data, or control, or a 
subtype such as authentication, which is a subtype of type management, or data_null, which is a 
subtype of type data. If the type-subtype field contains a type only, then the rule is tested for 
all subtypes of the specified type. For example, if the type-subtype field contains management 
then the rule will test any 802.11 header with a management subtype such as association request, 
association response, disassociation, authentication. If the type-subtype field contains a subtype 
such as authentication, the rule will test only the 802.11 frame with the authentication subtype.  
The type-subtype field stores the hex value of the type and subtype as defined in the IEEE 
standard for 802.11. 
Some examples of rule type-subtypes are [24]:
     type-subtype hex  binary value
                 keyword value subtype   type    description
#define MGMT_ASREQ   0x0       /* 0000    00  Association Req */
#define MGMT_ASRES   0x10     /* 0001    00  Association Res */
#define MGMT_REREQ   0x20     /* 0010    00  Reassoc. Req.    */
#define MGMT_RERES   0x30     /* 0011    00  Reassoc. Resp.  */
#define CONT_PS     0xa4     /* 1010    01  Power Save       */
#define CONT_RTS     0xb4     /* 1011    01  Request to send */
#define DATA_DATA    0x08     /* 0000    10  Data                  */
#define DATA_DTCFACK 0x18    /* 0001    10  Data + CF-Ack   */
The rule_nodes are stored in a tree like data structure made up of linked lists (see figure 6). The 
struct rule_tree_node holds the rule nodes.
struct rule_tree_node{
        int protocol; /* only 802.11 has been implemented */
        int type_subtype; /* 802.11 type/subtype */
        struct rule_tree_node *parent; /* parent node */
        struct rule_tree_node *prev; /* previous node */
        struct rule_tree_node *next; /* next node */
        struct rule_tree_node **children; /* child node */
        struct rule_node *rules; /* list of rules */
        };
Since only struct ieee80211_mgmt {…} is needed from the HostAP file ieee802_11.h, it is 
included in ruleslist.h directly rather than through the statement  #include < ieee802_11.h>.
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struct ieee80211_mgmt {
u16 frame_control;
u16 duration;
u8 da[6];
u8 sa[6];
u8 bssid[6];
u16 seq_ctrl;
union {
struct {
u16 auth_alg;
u16 auth_transaction;
u16 status_code;
/* possibly followed by Challenge text */
u8 variable[0];
} __attribute__ ((packed))  auth;
struct {
u16 reason_code;
} __attribute__ ((packed))  deauth;
struct {
u16 capab_info;
u16 listen_interval;
/* followed by SSID and Supported rates */
 u8 variable[0];
} __attribute__ ((packed))  assoc_req;
struct {
u16 capab_info;
u16 status_code;
u16 aid;
/* followed by Supported rates */
u8 variable[0];
} __attribute__ ((packed))  assoc_resp, reassoc_resp;
struct {
u16 capab_info;
u16 listen_interval;
u8 current_ap[6];
/* followed by SSID and Supported rates */
u8 variable[0];
} __attribute__ ((packed))  reassoc_req;
struct {
u16 reason_code;
} __attribute__ ((packed))  disassoc;
struct {
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u8 timestamp[8];
u16 beacon_int;
u16 capab_info;
/* followed by some of SSID, Supported rates,
 * FH Params, DS Params, CF Params, IBSS Params, TIM */
u8 variable[0];
} __attribute__ ((packed))  beacon;
} u;
} __attribute__ ((packed)) ;
6.3.2.4 ruleslist.c
Ruleslist.c performs the intrusion detection work in HostAP. It opens HostAP access point log 
file; writes messages to the log file; processes rules; creates the rule nodes and stores them in the 
rules tree, performs tests for valid type-subtypes, tests test keywords, and action key words; 
and applies rules to 802.11 frames and performs the rule action if the rule tests criteria are met.
Important functions in ruleslist.c are described below.
6.3.2.4.1 int process(struct rule_node *rulePtr){…}
Rules are received from the controller and processed by the function process(…) and stored in a 
rule_node struct. Rules longer than RULE_SIZE are truncated and only first RULE_SIZE 
characters are used. Process(…) calls functions to check type_subtypes against valid 802.11 
types and subtypes, to check tests against valid tests, and to check actions against valid actions. 
If the rule is valid, the data is stored in the rule_node. If rule has invalid data, the rule is skipped 
and process(…) prints "Error in line x. Rule not used." where x is the line number of the bad rule 
in the rules file. 
6.3.2.4.1.1 Tree description
The tree contains the intrusion detection rules used by WIDS.  There are two branches under the 
root. The 802.11b branch can be used for wireless cards running in either the hostAP mode or 
monitor mode. The HFA384x branch requires a wireless card to be in monitor mode and needs 
the two card implementation of WIDS. Rules were implemented only for the 802.11b branch. 
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Figure 6: Rules Tree
6.3.2.4.1  int applyRules(struct ieee80211_mgmt *mgmt, hostapd *hapd){…}
Since the frame control structure in 802.11 frames is the same for management, data and control 
type-subtypes, the struct ieee80211_mgmt can be used to apply rules for all the type-subtypes.
When HostAP receives an 802.11 frame, the applyRules(…) function is called to apply the rules 
to the frame. ApplyRules() searches the rule tree for rules with the same type-subtype as the 
802.11 frame. If a rule’s type-subtype matches the 802.11 frame control type-subtype the 
applyRules(…) calls the function 
int applyARule(struct rule_node *rule,struct ieee80211_mgmt *mgmt, hostapd 
*hapd){…}
      applyARule calls 
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int tests(struct rule_node *rule, struct ieee80211_mgmt *mgmt, hostapd *hapd){…}
to perform the tests.
As noted above, a rule can have more than one test and all tests in a rule must return true for rule 
action to be taken. As soon as one test returns false, the rule is false and no other tests for that 
rule need to be performed. If tests(…) returns true, which indicates that all test criteria have been 
met, applyARule(…) calls int actions(struct rule_node *rule,struct ieee80211_mgmt *mgmt, 
hostapd *hapd, u8 addr[]){…}to perform the action specified by the rule. ApplyRules(…) 
continues searching the rule tree for rules with the same type-subtype as the 802.11 frame and 
repeats the above procedures for each applicable rule.
 
6.3.2.4.2 int tests(struct rule_node *rule, struct ieee80211_mgmt *mgmt, hostapd 
*hapd){…)
Tests(…) checks each rule for more than one test and determines the order of the tests to be 
performed. If a test needs data from an IP packet, it is tested last. Testing IP data requires forking 
a new process to listen for IP packets on wlan0. If any other test is false, testing the IP data and 
creating a new process can be ignored. Tests(…)compares the rule’s test data to the data in the 
applicable 802.11 frame field in accordance with the operation described in the test keyword and 
returns true or false.   
If an intrusion detection rule needs info from an IP packet such as the time to live (TTL), 
HostAP forks a new process and runs a program scoop.c that listens for IP packets on wlan0. 
The IP listener program is based on libpcap and communicates with HostAP via shared memory. 
When an IP packet meeting the rule criteria is received, the IP listener signals HostAP and 
HostAP takes the action that is described in the intrusion detection rule. 
The shared memory is initialized when the access point starts up. Semaphores are used to control 
access to the shared memory. The shared memory and semaphore id’s are stored in the hostapd 
struct. The new process that listens for IP packets needs to know the shared memory and 
semaphore id’s. They are passed to the new process as command line arguments in the execl 
command. The IP listener process, scoop [22], is started as follows:
sprintf(filter,"%s%s","ip[8] > ", rule->test_data1);
execl("/home/jvigo/BOSNST/Scoopshared/scoop","scoop", "-i", "wlan0","-a",ascshmid,"-
m",ascsemid,"-x",filter,(char*)0);  
A program named scoop was used for the IP packet listener. Scoop was modified to access the 
HostAP shared memory and to test the rules contained in the shared memory. Only TTL rule has 
been implemented.
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Scoop uses the packet capture library libpcap and a filter for packet capturing can be given as a 
command line argument to scoop. All or part of the rule test information can be entered as a filter 
and then any packet captured by scoop has met the criteria of the test included in the filter. For 
example, if the test is for packets with TTL = 64, then HostAP sets the filter as  "ip[8] = 64". 
TTL starts at position 8 in the IP header. The value of TTL is given by rule->test_data1. Any 
packet captured by scoop has TTL = 64.
On termination scoop detaches from shared memory segment and removes the shared memory 
segment and semaphore.
6.3.2.4.3 int flagtests(struct rule_test *rule, struct ieee80211_mgmt *mgmt, u16 
flagtype){…}
Tests 802.11 header flags.
6.3.2.4.4 void iptestresult(hostapd *hapd){ …}
Iptestresult(… ) is called to take rule action if IP packets are tested and rule tests are true.
6.3.2.4.5 int actions(struct rule_node *rule,struct ieee80211_mgmt *mgmt, hostapd *hapd, 
u8 addr[]){ … }
Actions (…) gives action to take if tests returned true. 
6.3.2.4.6 Other functions
Ruleslist.c contains various other functions including functions to manipulate the rules tree, 
search the tree, find rules with a specific type or type_subtype, create new nodes, add nodes to 
rule tree, extract type from the 802.11 type_subtype value, find tree nodes with a specific 
type_subtype in a list, log messages, convert a MAC address from a character string to an 
unsigned integers and vice versa. 
6.3.2.5 validmac.c
Validmac.c creates a hash table, fills it with key value pairs from a file, and provides functions to 
insert new items into the table and to find an item in the table with key. Validmac.c uses the 
library libtable.a from the program table-4.3.0 for the hash table and related functions for hash-
table manipulations. 
Hash tables are used for two things in this program:
1. to store the Organizationally Unique Identifier (OUI) numbers(keys) and manufacturers      
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(values) for MAC hardware addresses. If an OUI is not found in the table, then it is not 
part of a valid MAC address. If an OUI is found in the table, the manufacture's name is 
returned. The Organizationally Unique Identifier (OUI) can be obtained from 
http://standards.ieee.org/regauth/oui/oui.txt. A perl utility program convert_ouihost.pl 
was written to convert the oui.txt file to the format needed by this program.
2. to store the intrusion detection rules numerical values (keys) for type-subtypes, tests 
keywords, and actions keywords and their text descriptions (values). In order to make the 
screen messages and logs readable, descriptive text is used instead of the hex values. For 
example, “type_subtype is Authentication” and “rule test is  
SOURCE_MAC_NOT_EQUAL” are more understandable than “type_subtype is 0xb0” 
and “rule test is 0x1f.” The file ruleslist.h contains the key value information needed. The 
file names used as input for the hash tables are specified in the hostapd.conf file.
6.4 Other Programs Used in the WIDS System
The WIDS software uses several other programs that were modified to work with HostAP.
6.4.1 fakeap
Fakeap [25] creates fake 802.11b access points. It can be used as a rule action.
Fakeap was modified to read MAC addresses and vendors from file that contains authorized OUI 
values for MAC address. Fakeap sends out an unlimited number of fake access points. When the 
fakeap action is triggered, a window pops up on the controller’s screen that has a button that is 
used to stop sending fake access points and to restore the WIDS AP original essid and MAC 
address.
6.4.2 scoop
Scoop is written by Mike D. Schiffman [26]. Scoop is a program which captures and decodes IP 
frames. Some changes were made to scoop to enable it use the intrusion detection rules.
The structs for sharedinfo, rule_node, and rule_test were added to scoop.h. Scoop.c was modified 
to read the shared memory id and the semaphore id from command line arguments. The struct 
sharedinfo *shared_ptr is set to the shared memory id.
A function void testpacket(struct scoop_pack *vp){…} was added to scoop.c to test other rule 
criteria which is not filtered out. The TTL example above captures all packets with TTL = 64. 
We may really want only packets with TTL = 64 from the MAC 00:02:2d:2e:5c:61. 
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testpacket(…) handles the source MAC equals 00:02:2d:2e:5c:61 test by comparing the MAC 
addresses included in the sharedinfo struct with the MAC in the ethernet frame received by 
scoop. If the two MAC’s are same, scoop sends a SIGUSR2 to the HostAP process to notify it 
that the rules criteria are true. When HostAP receives the SIGUSR2 message, it takes the action 
included in the rule.
6.4.3 table-4.3.0
Table [27] is a library for an open hash table with buckets and linked lists and functions to 
manipulate the table data.
6.5 WIDS Controller
Two of the controller’s responsibilities are to provide the access points with information needed 
to configure/reconfigure the directional antenna and to provide the intrusion detection rules for 
the access point.
The controller reads a configuration file at startup. The configuration file contains a hash of 
HostAP/WIDS access point names and their beginning sweep positions, ending sweep positions, 
and report rates; a hash of internal (non-WIDS) access points and their locations; the size of the 
grid for specifying access point locations; and a hash of the HostAP/WIDS access point names 
and their related locations, a numerical ID, and the midpoint of the beginning and ending sweep 
positions. The access points ID’s are numbers starting with 1 for left bottom corner of the 
perimeter and proceeding in a counterclockwise direction, 2 for the next access point, 3 for the 
next access point, etc. until all access points have a number. Numbering in this matter eliminates 
the need to consider x and y position values when comparing the location of one access point 
compared to the location of another.  
After the controller configuration is completed, the controller displays a GUI containing an image 
of the area to be protected and the internal non-WIDS access points. The controller opens a 
socket on a specified port and listens for messages from the access points. Messages are handled 
as discussed in the previously described protocol.
WIDS access points are displayed on the GUI as they are connected to the controller. The 
position of the antenna of each access point is designated by a sweeping line. The controller 
assumes that a station associates with the access point closest to it.
The controller operator can change the rules file, display statistics about the stations connected 
to the WIDS AP or query the log file. Screen shots of those operations are shown below.
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Figure 7: Change rules file
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Figure 8: Show Stats 
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Figure 9: WIDS log
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Figure 10: Result of query “Agere” on WIDS log 
The controller uses a simple algorithm to determine which access point to reconfigure when a 
maximum signal strength position has been received from an access point. If the position is 
greater than the access point's sweep midpoint, then the access point with the next highest ID 
number is reconfigured. If the position is less than the sweep midpoint, the access point with the 
next lowest ID number is reconfigured. When maximum signal strength positions for a MAC 
address are received from two WIDS access points, the controller can locate the access point's 
position using trigonometry (the law of sines and Pythagoras' theorem). The GUI draws a red 
box at the calculated location of the intruder.
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6.6 WIDS Simulation
6.6.1 Overview
The WIDS system can be run with simulated access points and simulated stations for testing or 
presentation purposes. The simulation handles up to sixteen WIDS access points. The WIDS 
access points can be either real (non-simulated) WIDS/HostAP access points, simulated access 
points or a combination of the two. If real WIDS/HostAP access points are used in the 
simulation, real stations can associate with them. The simulation does not handle simulated 
stations associating with a non-simulated WIDS/HostAP access point.
The simulation is written in Perl-TK. The simulation can be run on the same computer as the 
controller, the same computer as a real WIDS/HostAP access point, or a separate computer. It 
can be run from a command line or from a GUI. Use of the GUI requires a configuration file 
giving geometry for locating windows and a hash of commands for starting access points, 
controller, and virtual station. Other information in the simulation configuration file is controller 
IP and port for listening, access point name, access point port, delay per degree value, location, 
name of file containing simulated antenna readings, and an association allowed value. The delay 
per degree value determines the sweep speed of the simulated antenna. The association allowed 
determines if clients can associate with the access point.
If the simulation is run on the same computer as the controller or a real WIDS/HostAP access 
points, the performance of the WIDS system may decline significantly.  
Figure 11: WIDS Simulation Control GUI
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Figure 12: WIDS simulation with sixteen simulated access points
6.6.2 WIDS simulated access point
A WIDS simulated access point associates with a real (non-simulated) controller and receives no 
802.11b frames. A simulated access point has all the functionality of a real WIDS/HostAP access 
point except it doesn't process or test rules, the only 802.11b type/subtypes implemented are 
associate and disassociate, and it doesn't compute the maximum signal strength location using 
least squares regression. It just picks the position of the maximum value signal strength as a 
position with POINTS/2 increasing trend on one side and POINTS/2 decreasing trend on other 
side.
6.6.3 WIDS simulated station
The simulated station configuration file contains a hash of MAC addresses, locations, begin 
seconds and end seconds, a list of IP:port pairs representing simulated access points, the time 
between associates, and the timeframe that a station attempts to associate. The timeframe is 
designated by BEGIN and END in the configuration file. A station appears at BEGIN seconds 
after the virtual station simulation is started and ends END seconds after the virtual station 
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simulation is started. The simulation sends ASSOCIATE messages to the list of IP:port pairs for 
simulated stations whose timeframe is in effect. The rate of sending the ASSOCIATE messages is 
determined by the time between associates value in the configuration file.
6.6.4 WIDS simulation - other
The original controller and WIDS simulation were written by Dr. Golden Richard III. I have 
extended the simulation and controller to include more features and to handle real access points as 
part of the work for this thesis.  
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Chapter 7: Tests and Tests Result
7.1 Test 1 08/25/04
7.1.1 Description of test
There are two neighboring access points connected to the controller. One is a real (non-simulated) 
WIDS AP access point, named HOSTAP, and the other is a simulated access point, named 
BETA, running on the same computer as the WIDS AP access point.
The real stations, with MAC address 00:02:2D:2E:5C:61 and MAC address 00:0D:88:4B:E0:D6, 
both associate with the real WIDS AP access point. These are real associations. They are not 
simulated. The rules are applied to the 802.11 frames received from both of the real stations. The 
WIDS AP access point computes the position of the station 00:02:2D:2E:5C:61 maximum single 
strength using the data in its simulated antenna readings file and sends it to the controller. The 
WIDS controller reconfigures the simulated access point sweep arch.
The simulated access point computes the position of the station 00:02:2D:2E:5C:61 maximum 
single strength using the data in its simulated antenna readings file and sends it to the controller.
The controller computes the position of the station 00:02:2D:2E:5C:61 from the data received 
from the two access points.
In order to test the IP packet reading rule, the stations 00:02:2D:2E:5C:61 and 
00:0D:88:4B:E0:D6 ping the WIDS/HostAP access point. Four pings were sent from each 
station.
The station 00:0D:88:4B:E0:D6 is used only to test the rules. It does not appear on the WIDS 
controller GUI.   
7.1.2 Expected results
The rule 
“MGMT_ASREQ,(FLAG_RETRY:OFF!SOURCE_MAC_EQUALS:00022D2E5C61!), 
LOG,FLAG RETRY Off” should be true. The controller log should show an entry for HOSTAP 
with a message including the date and time and “FLAG RETRY Off, Association Req.”
The rule “MGMT_AUTH,(SOURCE_MAC_EQUALS:00022D2E5C61!TTL_EQUALS:64! 
FLAG_RETRY:OFF!),LOG, 02 2d 2e 5c 61 authenticated with ttl = 64” should be true. The 
controller log should show an entry for HOSTAP with a message including the date and time and 
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“02 2d 2e 5c 61 authenticated with ttl = 64, Authentication.” Since four pings are sent with TTL 
= 64, the log should show four messages.
All other rules are false and no action should be taken.
The controller log should show association messages with dates and times for station 
00:02:2d:2e:5c:61 with an Agere Systems wireless card and for station 00:0d:88:4b:e0:d6 with a 
D-Link wireless card.
The WIDS/HostAP log should show messages sent to the controller as a result of the rules. 
HostAP logs all authentications and associations in the /var/log/messages log. There should be 
messages with times and dates for authentication and association for stations 00:02:2D:2E:5C:61 
and 00:0d:88:4b:e0:d6.
Simulated antenna position of simulated access point BETA antenna when maximum signal 
received from station 00:02:2D:2E:5C:61 is 63 degrees. Simulated antenna position of HostAP 
access point HOSTAP antenna when maximum signal received from station 00:02:2D:2E:5C:61 
is -25 degrees. The station is located at (452.94, 334.64).
Pings will be sent from 00:02:2D:2E:5C:61 and 00:0d:88:4b:e0:d6 with TTL = 64. HostAP and 
controller logs should show test results for IP headers from 00:02:2D:2E:5C:61 and not from 
00:0d:88:4b:e0:d6.
7.1.3 Results of test
The controller log shows only the two lines expected as results of the intrusion detection rules 
(times are gm time):
 
HOSTAP Thu Aug 26 02:48:13 2004 FLAG RETRY Off Association Req
HOSTAP Thu Aug 26 02:51:56 2004  02 2d 2e 5c 61 authenticated with ttl = 64 
Authentication
The controller log shows the expected association messages from the two stations:
HOSTAP Thu Aug 26 02:48:16 2004 associated with  00:02:2d:2e:5c:61 wireless 
card Agere Systems
HOSTAP Thu Aug 26 02:48:20 2004 associated with  00:0d:88:4b:e0:d6 wireless 
card D:Link Corporation
The WIDS/HostAP log shows messages:
Wed Aug 25 21:48:13 2004
,FLAG RETRY Off,Association Req
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 Wed Aug 25 21:51:57 2004
, 02 2d 2e 5c 61 authenticated with ttl = 64,Authentication
 
The HostAP access point /var/log/messages log shows authentication and association of stations 
00:02:2d:2e:5c:61 and 00:0d:88:4b:e0:d6.
Aug 25 21:48:13 localhost hostapd: wlan0: STA 00:02:2d:2e:5c:61 IEEE 802.11: 
authenticated
Aug 25 21:48:13 localhost hostapd: wlan0: STA 00:02:2d:2e:5c:61 IEEE 802.11: 
associated (aid 1)
Aug 25 21:48:16 localhost hostapd: wlan0: STA 00:0d:88:4b:e0:d6 IEEE 802.11: 
authenticated
Aug 25 21:48:17 localhost hostapd: wlan0: STA 00:0d:88:4b:e0:d6 IEEE 802.11: 
authenticated
Aug 25 21:48:17 localhost hostapd: wlan0: STA 00:0d:88:4b:e0:d6 IEEE 802.11: 
associated (aid 2)
The controller received the antenna position of 63 degrees for simulated access point BETA 
antenna when the maximum signal message was received from station 00:02:2D:2E:5C:61 and the 
antenna position of -25 degrees for HostAP access point HOSTAP antenna when maximum 
signal received message was received from station 00:02:2D:2E:5C:61:
WIDS controller received client located at -25 (angle) from HOSTAP
WIDS controller received client located at 63 (angle) from BETA
The controller computed the station’s location as (452.94, 334.64):
ALERT client found at x = 452.936474021111 y = 334.641469930032
HostAP and controller logs show test results for IP headers from 00:02:2D:2E:5C:61 and not 
from 00:0d:88:4b:e0:d6. As additional testing on the IP packets, Scoop was run with the print 
hex option to dump the Ethernet and IP headers. The hostAP terminal window displayed the 
following for pings from 00:02:2D:2E:5C:61 and  pings from 00:0d:88:4b:e0:d6. Only the ping 
from 00:02:2D:2E:5C:61 shows a test result as expected.
IP: 192.168.0.69 -> 192.168.0.70 (60) id: 15773 ICMP: echo reply 
00 0002 2d2e 5c61 0004 5a0c d80c 0800 4500 
10 003c 3d9d 0000 4001 bb48 c0a8 0045 c0a8 
20 0046 0000 535c 0100 0100 6162 6364 6566 
30 6768 696a 6b6c 6d6e 6f70 7172 7374 7576 
40 7761 6263 6465 6667 6869 
scoop testing packet
test result is ....
Wed Aug 25 21:51:56 2004
, 02 2d 2e 5c 61 authenticated with ttl = 64,Authentication
 log action  02 2d 2e 5c 61 authenticated with ttl = 64
IP: 192.168.0.69 -> 192.168.0.70 (60) id: 15774 ICMP: echo reply 
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00 0002 2d2e 5c61 0004 5a0c d80c 0800 4500 
10 003c 3d9e 0000 4001 bb47 c0a8 0045 c0a8 … 
IP: 192.168.0.69 -> 192.168.0.71 (60) id: 3257 ICMP: echo reply 
00 000d 884b e0d6 0004 5a0c d80c 0800 4500 
10 003c 0cb9 0000 4001 ec2b c0a8 0045 c0a8 
20 0047 0000 535c 0100 0100 6162 6364 6566 
30 6768 696a 6b6c 6d6e 6f70 7172 7374 7576 
40 7761 6263 6465 6667 6869 
scoop testing packet
IP: 192.168.0.69 -> 192.168.0.71 (60) id: 3258 ICMP: echo reply 
00 000d 884b e0d6 0004 5a0c d80c 0800 4500 
10 003c 0cba 0000 4001 ec2a c0a8 0045 c0a8 … 
7.1.4 Test Results Conclusion
The test produced the expected results.
7.1.5 Screen Shot of Test 1
Figure 13: Reconfigured BETA AP and HOSTAP locating station
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7.1.6 Hardware used 
One IBM ThinkPad Pentium III 450 MHz, 128 Mb memory laptop with a Linksys Instant 
Wireless WPC11 wireless card (MAC address 00:04:5a:0c:d8:0c) running Linux and HostAP 
used for a WIDS/HostAP access point.
One generic Pentium 166 MHz, 32 Mb memory laptop with an Lucent Technologies Orinoco 
Silver 11 Mbits/s wireless card (MAC address 00:02:2D:2E:5C:61) address running Windows98 
used for a station connecting to the WIDS/HostAP access point.
One generic Pentium 166 MHz, 64 Mb memory pc, with a D-Link 520 vE1 wireless card (MAC 
address 00:0d:88:4b:e0:d6) running Windows98 used for a station connecting to the 
WIDS/HostAP access point . 
One Dell Pentium III 500 MHz, 192 Mb memory pc running Linux used for the controller.
 
One Soho 8 port 10Mbps Ethernet hub connecting the WIDS/HostAP access points and the 
controller.
7.1.7 Test Data
7.1.7.1 Rules file for test
MGMT_ASREQ,(FLAG_RETRY:OFF!SOURCE_MAC_EQUALS:00022D2E5C61!),LOG,FLAG RETRY Off
MGMT_ASREQ,(FLAG_RETRY:ON!SOURCE_MAC_EQUALS:00022D2E5C61!),LOG,FLAG RETRY On
MGMT_ASREQ,(DEST_MAC_EQUALS:00022D2E5C61!),LOG,assoc request dest mac 00 02 2d 
2e 5c 61
MGMT_AUTH,(SOURCE_MAC_EQUALS:00022D2E5C61!TTL_EQUALS:64!FLAG_RETRY:OFF!),LOG, 
02 2d 2e 5c 61 authenticated with ttl = 64
#MGMT_AUTH,(SOURCE_MAC_EQUALS:000D884BE0D6!TTL_EQUALS:64!FLAG_RETRY:OFF!),LOG,
00:0d:88:4b:e0:d6 authenticated with ttl = 64
#MGMT_AUTH,(SOURCE_MAC_EQUALS:00022D2E5C61!TTL_EQUALS:64!FLAG_RETRY:OFF!),DISA
SSOC, 02 2d 2e 5c 61 disassociated with ttl = 64
7.1.7.2 Access point MAC address 00:02:2D:2E:5C:61 antenna readings file
filename "angle4"
# format for a reading is degrees,signal strength;mac address, 
# first number represents the angle in degrees. The second number represents  
# the signal strength.
# next 6 numbers represent mac address. Each reading must be separated by ',' 
# or '/n' and there must be a '\n' before the EOF character
# comments start with '#' and the '#' is allowed only at start of line
-35,10;00:02:2D:2E:5C:61,-34,12;00:02:2D:2E:5C:61,-33,16;00:02:2D:2E:5C:61,-
56
32,20;00:02:2D:2E:5C:61,-31,23;00:02:2D:2E:5C:61,-30,25;00:02:2D:2E:5C:61,-
29,27;00:02:2D:2E:5C:61,-28,24;00:02:2D:2E:5C:61,-27,27;00:02:2D:2E:5C:61,-
26,28;00:02:2D:2E:5C:61,-25,29;00:02:2D:2E:5C:61,-24,26;00:02:2D:2E:5C:61,-
23,27;00:02:2D:2E:5C:61,-22,25;00:02:2D:2E:5C:61,-21,23;00:02:2D:2E:5C:61,-
20,20;00:02:2D:2E:5C:61,-19,16;00:02:2D:2E:5C:61,-18,14;00:02:2D:2E:5C:61,-
17,12;00:02:2D:2E:5C:61
7.1.7.3 Simulated access point antenna readings file
filename "data8"
57,32;00:02:2D:2E:5C:61
58,33;00:02:2D:2E:5C:61
59,38;00:02:2D:2E:5C:61
60,40;00:02:2D:2E:5C:61
61,44;00:02:2D:2E:5C:61
62,45;00:02:2D:2E:5C:61
63,47;00:02:2D:2E:5C:61
64,44;00:02:2D:2E:5C:61
65,43;00:02:2D:2E:5C:61
66,41;00:02:2D:2E:5C:61
67,30;00:02:2D:2E:5C:61
68,29;00:02:2D:2E:5C:61
7.1.8 Details of test results
7.1.8.1 HostAP log
log opened log.new Wed Aug 25 21:47:24 2004
Wed Aug 25 21:48:13 2004
,FLAG RETRY Off,Association Req
 HOSTAPHOSTAPWed Aug 25 21:51:56 2004
, 02 2d 2e 5c 61 authenticated with ttl = 64,Authentication
 Wed Aug 25 21:51:57 2004
, 02 2d 2e 5c 61 authenticated with ttl = 64,Authentication
 Wed Aug 25 21:51:58 2004
, 02 2d 2e 5c 61 authenticated with ttl = 64,Authentication
 Wed Aug 25 21:51:59 2004
, 02 2d 2e 5c 61 authenticated with ttl = 64,Authentication
 
7.1.8.2 Controller log
hostap.log opened gmtime Thu Aug 26 03:21:49 2004
HOSTAP Thu Aug 26 02:48:13 2004 FLAG RETRY Off Association Req
HOSTAP Thu Aug 26 02:48:16 2004 associated with  00:02:2d:2e:5c:61 wireless 
card Agere Systems
HOSTAP Thu Aug 26 02:48:20 2004 associated with  00:0d:88:4b:e0:d6 wireless 
card D:Link Corporation
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HOSTAP Thu Aug 26 02:51:56 2004  02 2d 2e 5c 61 authenticated with ttl = 64 
Authentication
HOSTAP Thu Aug 26 02:51:57 2004  02 2d 2e 5c 61 authenticated with ttl = 64 
Authentication
HOSTAP Thu Aug 26 02:51:58 2004  02 2d 2e 5c 61 authenticated with ttl = 64 
Authentication
HOSTAP Thu Aug 26 02:51:59 2004  02 2d 2e 5c 61 authenticated with ttl = 64 
Authentication
7.1.8.3 Controller Terminal display
Script started on Wed Aug 25 22:14:54 2004
dashipushi:/home/jv/widsfinal1 # ./controllernet
WIDS controller initializing using file "CONFIG.controllerhap".
KNOWN ACCESS POINT LIST:
CTR
CBR
PINKY
CTL
CBL
LAP1
BAP1
BAP3
ALPHA
BAP2
BETA
HOSTAP
TAP2
LAP3
LAP2
TAP1
WIDS controller configuration complete.
WIDS controller bringing up GUI.
WIDS controller: Image is 600 x 416.
WIDS controller listening on port 7777.
WIDS controller got connection.
WIDS controller sending CONFIG to BETA.
WIDS controller configured BETA, located @ (420,270).
WIDS controller got connection.
WIDS controller sending CONFIG to HOSTAP.
WIDS controller configured HOSTAP, located @ (420,350).
WIDS controller logging HOSTAP Thu Aug 26 02:48:13 2004 FLAG RETRY Off 
Association Req
WIDS controller logging HOSTAP Thu Aug 26 02:48:16 2004 associated with  
00:02:2d:2e:5c:61 wireless card Agere Systems
WIDS controller logging HOSTAP Thu Aug 26 02:48:20 2004 associated with  
00:0d:88:4b:e0:d6 wireless card D:Link Corporation
WIDS controller received client located at -25 (angle) from HOSTAP
adding to hash 00:02:2D:2E:5C:61 HOSTAP;-25;1
58
SENDING RECONFIG  to BETA POS = -25 -45 90 2
WIDS controller received client located at 63 (angle) from BETA
locating ap
name1= BETA,position1= 63, name2 =HOSTAP, position2= -25, ap1x=420 ap1y=270
ALERT client found at x = 452.936474021111 y = 334.641469930032
WIDS controller received client located at -25 (angle) from HOSTAP
WIDS controller logging HOSTAP Thu Aug 26 02:51:56 2004  02 2d 2e 5c 61 
authenticated with ttl = 64 Authentication
WIDS controller logging HOSTAP Thu Aug 26 02:51:57 2004  02 2d 2e 5c 61 
authenticated with ttl = 64 Authentication
WIDS controller logging HOSTAP Thu Aug 26 02:51:58 2004  02 2d 2e 5c 61 
authenticated with ttl = 64 Authentication
WIDS controller logging HOSTAP Thu Aug 26 02:51:59 2004  02 2d 2e 5c 61 
authenticated with ttl = 64 Authentication
WIDS controller received client located at -25 (angle) from HOSTAP
Use of uninitialized value in concatenation (.) or string at wids.pl line 466, 
<RULES> line 6.
mesg not defined type =   
** OTHER SIDE HUNG UP 11111 **
WIDS controller received client located at -25 (angle) from HOSTAP
Use of uninitialized value in concatenation (.) or string at wids.pl line 466, 
<RULES> line 6.
mesg not defined type =   
** OTHER SIDE HUNG UP 11111 **
dashipushi:/home/jv/widsfinal1 # 
Script done on Wed Aug 25 22:41:27 2004
The “use of unitialized value …” and “mesg not defined type = “  comments are results of the 
access points shutting down
7.1.8.4 HostAP terminal
Script started on Wed Aug 25 21:25:54 
2004]0;root@localhost:/home/jvigo/hostap-0.0.3/hostapd2new_shared4_clean1
[root@localhost hostapd2new_shared4_clean1]# ./hostapd hostapddashipushi.conf
Configuration file: hostapddashipushi.conf
table_alloc done 
table_alloc rule done 
could not insert in table: key exists and no overwrite,key=00:01:C8, c= 915 
could not insert in table: key exists and no overwrite,key=08:00:30, c= 14393 
could not insert in table: key exists and no overwrite,key=08:00:30, c= 14395 
log opened log.new Wed Aug 25 21:47:24 2004
HOSTAP;17;log opened ;Thu Aug 26 02:47:24 2004
ip add= 192.168.1.4, port 7777
WIDS AP HOSTAP connecting to CONTROLLER @ 192.168.1.4:7777.
controller registered sockfd= 4
hostap AP HOSTAP sending initial HELLO to WIDS controller.
WIDS hostap HOSTAP waiting for CONFIG message.
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message = CONTROLLER;2;-
45;45;2;MGMT_ASREQ,(FLAG_RETRY:OFF!SOURCE_MAC_EQUALS:00022D2E5C61!),LOG,FLAG 
RETRY Off
MGMT_ASREQ,(FLAG_RETRY:ON!SOURCE_MAC_EQUALS:00022D2E5C61!),LOG,FLAG RETRY On
MGMT_ASREQ,(DEST_MAC_EQUALS:00022D2E5C61!),LOG,assoc request dest mac 00 02 2d 
2e 5c 61
MGMT_AUTH,(SOURCE_MAC_EQUALS:00022D2E5C61!TTL_EQUALS:64!FLAG_RETRY:OFF!),LOG, 
02 2d 2e 5c 61 authenticated with ttl = 64
#MGMT_AUTH,(SOURCE_MAC_EQUALS:000D884BE0D6!TTL_EQUALS:64!FLAG_RETRY:OFF!),LOG,
00:0d:88:4b:e0:d6 authenticated with ttl = 64
#MGMT_AUTH,(SOURCE_MAC_EQUALS:00022D2E5C61!TTL_EQUALS:64!FLAG_RETRY:OFF!),DISA
SSOC, 02 2d 2e 5c 61 disassociated with ttl = 64
hostap AP HOSTAP received CONFIG: sweep -45 - 45, report rate 2
processing rules
Using interface wlan0ap with hwaddr 00:04:5a:0c:d8:0c and ssid 'jv.cs.uno.edu'
Flushing old station entries
Deauthenticate all stations
ieee802_11.c 10 /nieee802_11.c auth failed
wlan0: STA 00:02:2d:2e:5c:61 IEEE 802.11: authenticated
do auth stuff here
Wed Aug 25 21:48:13 2004
,FLAG RETRY Off,Association Req
 log action FLAG RETRY Off
wlan0: STA 00:02:2d:2e:5c:61 IEEE 802.11: associated (aid 1)
do associate stuff here
get ant readings
simulated antenna readings ok
Modified Scoop 1.0 [IP packet sniffing tool]
<ctrl-c> to quit
scoop pid = 1304
HOSTAP AP HOSTAP got ASSOCIATE from 00:02:2d:2e:5c:61, signal=120 @ position 
unknown
HOSTAPieee802_11.c 10 /nieee802_11.c auth failed
wlan0: STA 00:0d:88:4b:e0:d6 IEEE 802.11: authenticated
do auth stuff here
ieee802_11.c 10 /nieee802_11.c auth failed
wlan0: STA 00:0d:88:4b:e0:d6 IEEE 802.11: authenticated
do auth stuff here
wlan0: STA 00:0d:88:4b:e0:d6 IEEE 802.11: associated (aid 2)
do associate stuff here
get ant readings
simulated antenna readings ok
HOSTAP AP HOSTAP got ASSOCIATE from 00:0d:88:4b:e0:d6, signal=0 @ position 
unknown
HOSTAPmax signal is at -25.6176 sig= 29 
max signal is at -25.6176 sig= 29 
IP: 192.168.0.69 -> 192.168.0.70 (60) id: 15773 ICMP: echo reply 
00 0002 2d2e 5c61 0004 5a0c d80c 0800 4500 
10 003c 3d9d 0000 4001 bb48 c0a8 0045 c0a8 
20 0046 0000 535c 0100 0100 6162 6364 6566 
30 6768 696a 6b6c 6d6e 6f70 7172 7374 7576 
60
40 7761 6263 6465 6667 6869 
scoop testing packet
test result is ....
Wed Aug 25 21:51:56 2004
, 02 2d 2e 5c 61 authenticated with ttl = 64,Authentication
 log action  02 2d 2e 5c 61 authenticated with ttl = 64
IP: 192.168.0.69 -> 192.168.0.70 (60) id: 15774 ICMP: echo reply 
00 0002 2d2e 5c61 0004 5a0c d80c 0800 4500 
10 003c 3d9e 0000 4001 bb47 c0a8 0045 c0a8 
20 0046 0000 525c 0100 0200 6162 6364 6566 
30 6768 696a 6b6c 6d6e 6f70 7172 7374 7576 
40 7761 6263 6465 6667 6869 
scoop testing packet
test result is ....
Wed Aug 25 21:51:57 2004
, 02 2d 2e 5c 61 authenticated with ttl = 64,Authentication
 log action  02 2d 2e 5c 61 authenticated with ttl = 64
IP: 192.168.0.69 -> 192.168.0.70 (60) id: 15775 ICMP: echo reply 
00 0002 2d2e 5c61 0004 5a0c d80c 0800 4500 
10 003c 3d9f 0000 4001 bb46 c0a8 0045 c0a8 
20 0046 0000 515c 0100 0300 6162 6364 6566 
30 6768 696a 6b6c 6d6e 6f70 7172 7374 7576 
40 7761 6263 6465 6667 6869 
scoop testing packet
test result is ....
Wed Aug 25 21:51:58 2004
, 02 2d 2e 5c 61 authenticated with ttl = 64,Authentication
 log action  02 2d 2e 5c 61 authenticated with ttl = 64
IP: 192.168.0.69 -> 192.168.0.70 (60) id: 15776 ICMP: echo reply 
00 0002 2d2e 5c61 0004 5a0c d80c 0800 4500 
10 003c 3da0 0000 4001 bb45 c0a8 0045 c0a8 
20 0046 0000 505c 0100 0400 6162 6364 6566 
30 6768 696a 6b6c 6d6e 6f70 7172 7374 7576 
40 7761 6263 6465 6667 6869 
scoop testing packet
test result is ....
Wed Aug 25 21:51:59 2004
, 02 2d 2e 5c 61 authenticated with ttl = 64,Authentication
 log action  02 2d 2e 5c 61 authenticated with ttl = 64
IP: 192.168.0.69 -> 192.168.0.71 (60) id: 3257 ICMP: echo reply 
00 000d 884b e0d6 0004 5a0c d80c 0800 4500 
10 003c 0cb9 0000 4001 ec2b c0a8 0045 c0a8 
20 0047 0000 535c 0100 0100 6162 6364 6566 
30 6768 696a 6b6c 6d6e 6f70 7172 7374 7576 
40 7761 6263 6465 6667 6869 
scoop testing packet
IP: 192.168.0.69 -> 192.168.0.71 (60) id: 3258 ICMP: echo reply 
00 000d 884b e0d6 0004 5a0c d80c 0800 4500 
10 003c 0cba 0000 4001 ec2a c0a8 0045 c0a8 
20 0047 0000 525c 0100 0200 6162 6364 6566 
30 6768 696a 6b6c 6d6e 6f70 7172 7374 7576 
40 7761 6263 6465 6667 6869 
61
scoop testing packet
IP: 192.168.0.69 -> 192.168.0.71 (60) id: 3259 ICMP: echo reply 
00 000d 884b e0d6 0004 5a0c d80c 0800 4500 
10 003c 0cbb 0000 4001 ec29 c0a8 0045 c0a8 
20 0047 0000 515c 0100 0300 6162 6364 6566 
30 6768 696a 6b6c 6d6e 6f70 7172 7374 7576 
40 7761 6263 6465 6667 6869 
scoop testing packet
IP: 192.168.0.69 -> 192.168.0.71 (60) id: 3260 ICMP: echo reply 
00 000d 884b e0d6 0004 5a0c d80c 0800 4500 
10 003c 0cbc 0000 4001 ec28 c0a8 0045 c0a8 
20 0047 0000 505c 0100 0400 6162 6364 6566 
30 6768 696a 6b6c 6d6e 6f70 7172 7374 7576 
40 7761 6263 6465 6667 6869 
scoop testing packet
max signal is at -25.6176 sig= 29 
max signal is at -25.6176 sig= 29 
handle term
killing 1304
cleaning up shared memory struct 
eloop.c after loop
Removing station 00:0d:88:4b:e0:d6
Removing station 00:02:2d:2e:5c:61
Flushing old station entries
Deauthenticate all stations
]0;root@localhost:/home/jvigo/hostap-0.0.3/hostapd2new_shared4_clean1
[root@localhost hostapd2new_shared4_clean1]# 
[root@localhost hostapd2new_shared4_clean1]# Script done on Wed Aug 25 
21:54:12 2004
7.1.8.5 BETA terminal
[root@localhost root]# cd /root/wids
[root@localhost wids]# perl accesspt2net
WIDS AP BETA connecting to controller @ 192.168.1.4:7777.
WIDS AP BETA sending initial HELLO to WIDS controller.
WIDS AP BETA waiting for CONFIG message.
57,32;00:02:2D:2E:5C:61
adding to allowed mac hash 00:02:2D:2E:5C:61 associate allowed = 1
58,33;00:02:2D:2E:5C:61
59,38;00:02:2D:2E:5C:61
60,40;00:02:2D:2E:5C:61
61,44;00:02:2D:2E:5C:61
62,45;00:02:2D:2E:5C:61
63,47;00:02:2D:2E:5C:61
64,44;00:02:2D:2E:5C:61
65,43;00:02:2D:2E:5C:61
66,41;00:02:2D:2E:5C:61
67,30;00:02:2D:2E:5C:61
68,29;00:02:2D:2E:5C:61
WIDS AP BETA received CONFIG: sweep -45 - 45, report rate 2.
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WIDS AP BETA listening on port 7001 for virtual client.
reconfig message -45 90 2
ap got reconfig
vcexists 0
 reconf received
position -11, begin -45, end 90 at receive reconf in nfound
sending position  63,  00:02:2D:2E:5C:61, 0
pos =-45 end = 90 beg = -45
back to original config BETA count = 2 end =45 begin = -45 pos =-45, dir= 1 
mac
0
[root@localhost wids]#
[root@localhost wids]#
7.1.9 Commands to run test
On HostAP access point laptop:
     1. Start simulated access point
 
/root/wids # perl accesspt2net
     2. In another terminal window - start hostapd
/home/jvigo/hostap-0.0.3/hostapd2new_sharedclean1 # ./hostapd
     hostapddashipushi.conf
On controller pc:
     1. Start controller
      
/home/jv/widsfinal1# ./controllernet
7.2 Additional comments
The test used one real WIDS access point and one simulated WIDS access point, a controller 
which handles both real and simulated WIDS access points, and two real 802.11b stations. The 
test produced the expected results and shows that the WIDS software successfully implements 
parts of the complete WIDS package. However, the software needs to be extended to handle the 
rotating directional antennas and tests of the location calculations and antenna reconfiguration 
need to be performed with the actual hardware.
The terminals show a lot of messages and frame data that are used for debugging purposes. Once 
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the software is sufficiently tested and debugged, most of those messages will be turned off and 
only essential messages will be displayed. 
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Chapter 8: Conclusion and suggestions for future work
8.1 Conclusion
This paper presented a description of the IEEE802.11b standard and some of the problems of 
802.11b wireless networks which leave them vulnerable to attacks from unauthorized users. 
Several types of attacks were discussed and a Wireless Intrusion Detection System (WIDS) was 
proposed to improve the security of wireless networks. The WIDS uses access points equipped 
with rotating directional antennas to identify and respond to potential threats and to locate 
potential intruders.
The WIDS will surround an omni-directional wireless network and a remote station beyond the 
perimeter of the omni network will connect to a WIDS AP before connecting to the omni AP. A 
set of rules is used to determine whether or not the remote station is an intruder. The WIDS APs 
are connected to a controlling computer via a wired network. The controlling computer configures 
the WIDS AP’s and locates intruder stations using data from two WIDS APs.
The WIDS APs run HostAP software that is modified to include a rule based intrusion detection 
system, a protocol for communicating with a controlling computer via a wired network, and to 
process data from a simulated directional antenna. A laptop computer with a Prism wireless card 
is used as a WIDS AP. The controller computer software is written in Perl-TK. A combination of 
simulated and non-simulated tests was used to show that the WIDS can provide additions to 
802.11b security. The WIDS controller is able to connect to real and virtual WIDS APs and real 
802.11b stations are able to connect to a real WIDS AP. The antenna functions of a WIDS AP are 
simulated due the lack of rotating directional antennas for the WIDS APs. Simulated WIDS APs 
and stations are used to show how WIDS would operate with several WIDS APs and stations. 
Although the WIDS APs were not fully implemented, this paper shows that it is feasible to 
provide additional 802.11b security using off the shelf hardware and open source software. Other 
research mentioned in the paper shows that it is possible to locate wireless stations with 
directional antennas. All that remains to complete a WIDS prototype is to build a WIDS AP with 
an embedded computer and a rotational antenna and to modify the WIDS HostAP software to 
control the movement of the antenna. 
Even though IEEE801.11i improves security of wireless networks, there is still a need for 
additional security provided by WIDS. Installed wireless networks will not be immediately 
updated. New hardware is needed for CCMP, which could be expensive for large networks. Since 
IEEE 802.11i is new technology, there can be configuration or implementation errors. 
Authentication mechanisms can be compromised by human errors or by lost or stolen equipment.
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8.2 Suggestions for further work
In addition to building a WIDS AP as mentioned above, there are several things that can be done 
to improve the WIDS implementation.
8.2.1 Expand rule processing 
8.2.1.1. Handle logical OR in rules testing
Currently, all tests in a rule must be true for rule to be true. For a rule with three tests, this is 
equivalent to “test1 && test2 && test3” where testx is the result of a test. The rules processing 
could be modified to handle both the logical AND and OR operations and rule would test for 
“test1 || test2 || test3.”
8.2.1.2. Implement more IP rules and tests
The only field in an IP header that can be tested by a rule is the TTL field. The rule processing 
could be expanded to include tests of more IP header fields.
8.2.1.3 Implement HFA384 rx rules
Rules testing the radio information contained in the HFA384 Rx frames could be implemented. 
This requires a second wireless card in monitor mode to get time, signal, silence and rate.  
 
8.2.2 Expand controller functions 
8.2.2.1 Check for APs that are down
If the controller doesn’t receive reports from an AP for x seconds, it assumes the AP is down or 
it is a denial of service attack victim. The controller would reconfigure AP’s on each side of 
downed AP to sweep its territory and attempt to compute the location of a potential intruder.
8.2.2.2 Notify others of important events
The controller could “beep” and flash warning messages on its monitor when something 
important happens and it could send e-mail to other computers.
8.2.2.3 Improve handling of moving stations
A station’s location is computed once. If the station moves without reassociating, its new 
location is not computed. The controller could check for moving stations and recomputed the 
new locations.
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Appendix
WIDS Access Point components
Stepper Motor Controller (STP 100)
http link : www.pontech.com/products/stp100/index.htm
Price : $159.00
Stepper Motor (Vexta PK268-01A)
http link : www.pontech.com/products/vexta/index.htm
Price : $99.00
Netgate Prism Card (NL-2511 CD PLUS EXT2)
http link : www.netgate.com/NL2511.html
Price : $75.00
Pigtail for the wireless card to allow connection of directional antenna
Price : $25.00
Celestron 93499 heavy duty tripod
http link : www.digitalfotoclub.com/products2/Celestron_Heavy_Duty_Tripod_93499.html
Price : $325.00
X-Scale Single Board Computer and Wireless Networking Platform (SP-KIT400, SPB400CA, 
SDC400CA)
http link : www.xbox.com/Products/Xscale.htm
Price : $795.00 (SP-KIT400)
           $575.00 (SPB400CA)
           $159.00 (SDC400CA)
Power supply +5V/15A, +12V/4A, -12V/1A, 24V/3A Supply, stock number 14066 PS
http link : www.powersupplydepot.com/14066-PS.htm
Price : $29.95
Directional antenna with mounting hardware
Price : $150.00
Additional supplies, including aluminum poles for mounting directional antennas, enclosures for 
the electronics, cables, solder, and electrical connectors
Price : $300.00
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